DLP Insights

The right to criticize and libel

Categories: DLP Insights, Case Law | Tag: Dismissal, Court of Cassation

25 Sep 2018

With its recent judgement no. 21965 dated 10 September 2018, the Court of Cassation once again ruled on the well-known controversial issue of the boundaries between the right to criticize and insubordination, upholding the decision of the trial court. The judgement at hand found the dismissal imposed on an employee, who had uttered words deemed libellous by the employer, unlawful. More specifically, the employee – at the time of the events, a trade union representative – had been caught transmitting – via a Facebook chat – lines with a libellous, critical and offensive content regarding the director of his employing company, calling him slave-trader. The Court of Cassation, called to rule on the matter, established that in the case at hand the prerequisites for libel did not exist, because the worker had uttered those words on a private chat, the access to which was allowed only to the members of the trade union to which he belonged. On this point, the Court of Cassation clarified that the digital venue where this action had been committed must be considered a “private digital place of debate and sharing of opinions”: hence, a reserved and safe place which, as such, determines for those who are part of it a set of rights, including the right to privacy and freedom to exchange correspondence. In support of its stance, the Court of Cassation remarked that (i) Article 15 of the Workers’ Statute considers “freedom and the right to correspondence and any other form of communication” inviolable, as secrecy should be intended as the expression of the broadest freedom to communicate with predetermined subjects, and therefore as assumption that subjects other than the selected recipients do not illegitimately get to know the content of a communication and (ii) the protection of secrecy implies, in addition to the choice of the recipients and the sender’s intention to exclude other persons from knowing the message, also the use of a tool that embodies the quality of secrecy or confidentiality of the communication. Moreover, the Court, making reference to one of its previous rulings, reiterated that the right protected under Article 15 of the Italian Constitution “includes correspondence and the other forms of communication, including telephone, electronic, computer-aided communications between those present or those effected by other means provided by the ever-improving technologies.” Therefore, the need to protect the secrecy of communications also includes e-mail messages exchanged by mailing lists reserved to the members of a given group of people, newsgroups or private chat lines, whose access is conditional upon a password given to specific subjects. Lastly, the Court of Cassation specified that legitimizing dismissal for the reasons brought to its attention would be tantamount to legitimizing the control of the employer over the freedom to criticize, as well as, considering the circumstances, a violation of the trade union’s freedom, which in this way would be necessarily and inevitably demeaned. In consideration of all of the above, the Court of Cassation ordered reinstatement of the worker in his former job and payment of damage.

More insights