“The images collected through audiovisual systems may be used for disciplinary purposes only if all the conditions laid down by Article 4 of the Italian Workers’ Statute are met and provided that neither the law nor collective bargaining agreements limit such use; where a collective agreement provides for a clause on inadmissibility, that restriction remains fully effective even after the 2015 reform of the relevant provisions.” This was held by the Italian Supreme Court in judgment no. 30822 of November 24, 2025, which addresses the relationship between video surveillance, disciplinary powers, and collective bargaining.
The case arose from the dismissal of an employee working as a croupier, who was accused by the employer of having appropriated cash during chip-changing operations. The evidence relied upon by the company consisted of video footage recorded by cameras installed above the gaming tables, authorised several years earlier by the Labour Inspectorate.
While the first-instance court upheld the validity of the employer’s termination decision, the Court of Appeal declared the footage inadmissible and the dismissal unlawful, relying on a clause contained in the administrative authorisation – expressly incorporated into the collective agreement – which provided that the footage could not be used to support disciplinary charges against croupiers.
Given that the administrative authorisation had been obtained before the 2015 reform, the company appealed, arguing that the Jobs Act, by amending Article 4(3) of the Workers’ Statute, introduced the rule that images may be used “for all purposes connected with the employment relationship”, including disciplinary purposes, provided that the employee has been informed and data protection rules are complied with. According to this interpretation, the restrictive clause in the authorisation – and mirrored in the collective agreement – should be considered superseded by the new wording of Article 4 of the Workers’ Statute.
The Italian Supreme Court rejected the employer’s interpretation, recalling that Article 4 of the Workers’ Statute distinguishes between two categories of tools: tools that are potentially suitable for remote monitoring of employees’ activity, which require a trade union agreement or an authorisation from the Labour Inspectorate; and work tools, for which no such prior procedure is necessary. In the case at hand, the Court confirmed that the cameras could be regarded as “work tools”: their use was reserved exclusively to the control room and did not serve croupiers in performing their duties. On this basis, the Court found that Article 4 (1) and all related constraints were fully applicable.
With regard to the use of images for disciplinary purposes, the Court acknowledged that, following the 2015 reform, Article 4 (3) expressly allows such use, thereby overcoming the traditional distinction between defensive monitoring and monitoring of work performance. However, the Court emphasised that this rule applies only where no other sources – such as collective agreements – restrict the use of such data.
In earlier decisions, the Italian Supreme Court had already clarified that restrictive clauses contained in pre-reform administrative authorisations would not survive where incompatible with the new statutory framework.
In this case, however, the restriction was not confined to the authorisation: it had been expressly incorporated by the social partners into the collective agreement, through a specific clause reproducing the prohibition on using images for disciplinary purposes, even in the presence of conduct detrimental to the company’s assets.
“In this perspective, the inadmissibility of the information gathered through video cameras represents an expression of the free exercise of collective autonomy, which is undoubtedly worthy of protection, and in this case operates as a more favourable clause for the employee”.
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With judgment no. 43873 of November 24, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – Labor Division – confirmed the legitimacy of a dismissal for just cause imposed on an employee on the basis of GPS data collected from the company car, reiterating that such monitoring activities are admissible when they are aimed at verifying unlawful conduct.
In the case at hand, the employee was working as a security guard using a company car equipped with a satellite tracking system. Following reports from clients regarding service disruptions, the employer initiated checks to reconstruct how the service had been performed during working hours.
The analysis of the vehicle’s GPS data showed that, on three separate occasions and during his assigned shift, the employee had parked the vehicle and remained inside it, whereas the service report he had drafted stated that he had visited different locations during the same time periods. This discrepancy between the employee’s statements and the GPS data led the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings, considering the conduct inconsistent with the required operating procedures. Moreover, the conduct was not an isolated incident but formed part of a repeated pattern of behaviour, previously sanctioned with conservative disciplinary measures. Based on these findings, the employer terminated the employment relationship for just cause.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, classifying the monitoring activities as defensive controls (i.e. checks aimed at detecting potentially unlawful conduct), thus excluding the applicability of Article 4 of Law no. 300/1970 (i.e. the Workers’ Statute), as the monitoring was aimed at verifying conduct potentially harmful to the organisation.
The Italian Supreme Court dismissed the employee’s appeal and confirmed this approach, reiterating that employers may legitimately use technological tools, such as GPS systems installed on company vehicles, when the monitoring is targeted, proportionate, and justified by the need to verify conduct that goes beyond the mere supervision of work performance.
The Court further clarified that determining whether such monitoring is aimed at detecting unlawful conduct, rather than surveilling work performance, is a factual assessment reserved to the lower courts and not subject to review on appeal, provided the reasoning is coherent. In this case, the appellate court found that the employee’s conduct was incompatible with the duties of fairness and loyalty and significantly damaged the relationship of trust.
In conclusion, this ruling confirms that GPS data collected from a company vehicle may legitimately ground a dismissal for just cause when the monitoring pursues defensive purposes and is aimed at determining conduct inconsistent with contractual obligations, without resulting in generalised surveillance of work performance.
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In judgment no. 28367 of 27 October 2025, the Court of Cassation – Labour Section – upheld the legitimacy of the summary dismissal imposed on an employee who, outside working hours, had engaged in sporting activities that were inconsistent with the medical prescriptions limiting his physical fitness for the performance of certain duties.
In the case at hand, a production-line worker had been declared fit for work with restrictions by the occupational physician, who had prohibited him from handling loads exceeding 18 kg and from lifting items above shoulder height due to a spinal condition. The employer, however, discovered that the employee routinely worked as a personal trainer at a gym in his free time, performing weightlifting exercises that were incompatible with the imposed restrictions. Evidence of such conduct also came from videos posted by the employee himself on his social media profiles.
Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of Rome upheld the legitimacy of the disciplinary dismissal, finding that the conduct in question was capable of undermining the relationship of trust and amounted to a breach of the employee’s duties of loyalty, fairness and good faith. The Court of Appeal, in particular, emphasised that the evidence of the facts did not derive from the investigative activities ordered by the employer, but from the employee’s own conduct during the proceedings—he had never disputed the factual circumstances alleged—and from the content he himself had shared online.
The Court of Cassation dismissed the employee’s appeal in its entirety, confirming the soundness of the reasoning adopted by the lower courts. First, it reiterated that the obligations of an employee do not end with the performance of work duties, but extend to ancillary duties of fairness and good faith, which complement and broaden the duty of loyalty owed to the employer. These obligations also apply to off-duty conduct when such conduct may potentially harm the employer’s interests or undermine the trust required for the continuation of the employment relationship.
Second, the Supreme Court clarified that, for just cause to be established, actual harm is not required; it is sufficient for the conduct to be potentially detrimental. In the case at hand, the employee’s systematic engagement in sporting activities that contravened medical prescriptions was deemed incompatible with the restrictions imposed to protect his health, exposing the employer to the risk of an aggravation of the condition and further sickness absences.
In conclusion, the ruling reaffirms that the employee’s duty of loyalty includes the obligation to maintain behaviour consistent with their physical condition and with the employer’s organisational needs, even outside working hours. Engaging in sporting activities that may be harmful to one’s health, in violation of medical prescriptions known to the employer, constitutes a serious breach of trust and may justify summary dismissal.
In its judgment no. 500/2025, the Court of Appeal of Bologna, on 13 October 2025, provides an important analysis of the principles governing challenges to multiple dismissals served on the same employee, with a specific focus on the distinction between “subsequent” and “simultaneous” dismissals and the resulting procedural implications. The Court, upholding the first-instance decision, rejected the employee’s appeal and reiterated that the failure to challenge one of the two dismissals in court makes that dismissal final, thereby eliminating any standing to sue (i.e. “interesse ad agire”) in relation to the other.
The case originated from two dismissals for just cause served on a branch manager. The employer had contested two separate disciplinary charges: the first concerning unauthorised absences, and the second concerning irregular use of the company fuel card. At the end of the two disciplinary proceedings, the employer issued two separate dismissal letters, one for each charge. Both letters were received by the employee at the same time.
The employee challenged both dismissals out of court with a single notice, but subsequently brought judicial proceedings only against the first dismissal, and not against the second.
The first-instance court dismissed the claim for “lack of concrete standing to sue”. The Tribunal reasoned that even if the challenged dismissal were found unlawful, the employment relationship would still be deemed terminated due to the second dismissal, which – having not been challenged in court – had become valid, effective, and capable of producing its effects.
The employee appealed the first-instance judgment, raising three grounds of appeal. The core of his defence lay in the first ground, in which he challenged the finding of lack of standing. The appellant argued that the two dismissals, although sent on the same day, had been issued at different times (3:15 p.m. and 3:17 p.m.), thus constituting so-called “successive dismissals”.
Relying on Italian Supreme Court case law (judgments no. 106/2013, no. 1244/2011, and no. 2274/2024), he argued that the second dismissal should be considered tamquam non esset, as it was based on facts already known to the employer at the time of the first dismissal. Therefore, the second dismissal was non-existent, and his interest in obtaining a ruling on the unlawfulness of the first dismissal should be recognised. In the remaining grounds of appeal, he reiterated his arguments on the merits, contesting the factual basis of the alleged unauthorised absences and seeking reinstatement.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, holding the first ground unfounded and the others absorbed. The decision rests on a careful analysis of the legal nature of dismissals and the moment at which they take effect.
The central issue in the judgment is the classification of the two dismissals as simultaneous, rather than subsequent.
The Court clarified that the case law on “successive dismissals”, invoked by the appellant, does not apply, as it concerns dismissals served at different and subsequent points in time. To establish simultaneity, the panel identified the legally relevant moment not in the date or time of dispatch of the letters, but in the moment of their receipt by the employee. As dismissals are unilateral receptive acts, their effectiveness depends on when they enter the employee’s sphere of knowledge.
The Court emphasised that: “…this conclusion follows from the fact that the two dismissals affecting the present appellant – although distinct – must be considered simultaneous, and the principles set out in the Supreme Court case law relied upon by the appellant […] cannot apply, as they concern cases of dismissals that are subsequent to one another (so-called ‘successive dismissals’).”
The Court also highlighted that the employee’s own out-of-court challenge, which referred to both dismissals with a single date (28 June 2023) and without distinguishing the time of receipt, further confirmed their simultaneous nature.
On this basis, the Court upheld the correctness of the first-instance judgment. Since the second dismissal (concerning the fuel card) was not challenged in court within the 180-day statutory limitation period, it became final and fully effective in terminating the employment relationship.
This rendered any ruling on the lawfulness of the first dismissal irrelevant. Even if the first dismissal were declared null or unlawful, the employment relationship would in any event be considered terminated by the second dismissal, which had become definitive due to the lack of judicial challenge. Accordingly, the employee no longer had any concrete and current interest in obtaining a judgment on the first dismissal, thus justifying the procedural dismissal of the claim.
With judgment no. 28365 of 27 October 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – Labor Division – addressed the balance between an employer’s monitoring powers and employees’ rights to data protection and privacy. The Italian Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of a dismissal for just cause imposed on an employee who had disclosed personal data, information, and company documents. The disciplinary charges were based on findings emerging from checks carried out by the employer on the company laptop assigned to the employee.
The Court of Appeal held that the employer’s activity complied with Article 4 of Italian Law no. 300/1970 (i.e. “Statuto dei lavoratori”), as the company had demonstrated that adequate prior information had been provided to the employee “through dissemination of the corporate policy governing the use of IT equipment”. According to that policy, “the employer informed […] employees of the possibility of carrying out checks and inspections in the event of detected anomalies, in compliance with the applicable legislation, reserving the right, where non-compliant conduct was identified, to apply the contractual provisions governing disciplinary measures”.
The Italian Supreme Court agreed, stating that the employer had fulfilled the requirements of Article 4 of Law no. 300/1970 by providing employees with prior and adequate information regarding the possibility of carrying out checks on company IT tools.
The consequences for employers are twofold. On the one hand, the company risks exposure to significant sanctions under data protection law for unlawful processing of personal data. On the other hand, any information collected in breach of the law becomes entirely unusable for all purposes connected with the employment relationship, including the possibility of grounding disciplinary action on such evidence.
