The Regulatory Framework and Established Jurisprudential Orientation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
To understand the scope of the Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling, it is necessary to outline the regulatory and jurisprudential context in which it is situated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The core of the legislation is found in Article 6 of Law No. 604 of 15 July 1966<\/strong>. In its current form\u2014shaped by amendments first introduced by Article 32 of Law No. 183\/2010 and later by Article 1, paragraph 38, of Law No. 92\/2012\u2014the provision structures dismissal challenges as a progressive process<\/strong>, marked by two temporal thresholds<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First Term (Extrajudicial Challenge):<\/strong> The employee must contest the dismissal \u201cunder penalty of forfeiture within sixty days of receiving written notice\u201d<\/em>. The challenge may be made \u201cthrough any written act, including extrajudicial, suitable to make the employee\u2019s intention known\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second Term (Judicial Action):<\/strong> The extrajudicial challenge is considered \u201cineffective if not followed, within the subsequent one hundred and eighty days, by filing a claim with the labor court registry or by notifying the other party of a request for conciliation or arbitration\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Failure to comply with even a single one of these deadlines results in the forfeiture of the right to challenge the dismissal and, consequently, in the stabilization of its effects, preventing the employee from seeking either reinstatement or the merely compensatory remedies provided by the special legislation.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The classification of the term as a \u201cforfeiture period\u201d<\/strong> is of crucial importance. Pursuant to Article 2964 of the Italian Civil Code<\/strong>, forfeiture is neither subject to interruption nor suspension, unless otherwise provided. This general principle renders the dismissal challenge period impervious to personal circumstances that would normally suspend the running of time, such as illness. The rationale behind this rule is to require the exercise of a right within a predetermined and brief timeframe, thereby crystallizing an otherwise uncertain legal situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 60-day period (dies a quo)<\/strong> begins from the \u201creceipt\u201d of the dismissal notice. Since dismissal is a unilateral communicative act, its effectiveness and the commencement of the related deadlines are governed by Article 1335 of the Civil Code<\/strong>, which establishes a presumption of knowledge:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cA proposal, acceptance, revocation, or any other declaration addressed to a specific person is deemed known at the moment it reaches the recipient\u2019s address, unless the recipient proves that, without fault, they were unable to have knowledge of it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It is precisely the interpretation of this provision that underpins the established jurisprudential orientation<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, the Supreme Court\u2019s rulings, dating back to early decisions such as Cass. no. 5563 of 1982<\/strong>, have interpreted these rules in a rigorous and formalistic manner, prioritizing legal certainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dominant approach follows the so-called \u201ctheory of receipt\u201d<\/strong> or \u201ctheory of knowability\u201d<\/strong>. Under this interpretation, what matters for the effectiveness of the act is not the actual knowledge of the recipient, but its mere knowability, which is presumed at the moment the act reaches the recipient\u2019s address.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a direct consequence, the rebuttal allowed under Article 1335 c.c.<\/strong> (\u201cimpossibility of knowledge without fault\u201d) cannot relate to the recipient\u2019s subjective conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As highlighted by the United Sections in the ordinance referring the matter to the Constitutional Court:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe evidence suitable to overcome the presumption must therefore concern circumstances not related to the recipient\u2019s subjective conditions but to external and objective factors, concerning the connection between the individual and the place of delivery, sufficient to exclude the knowability of the act\u201d (Cass., United Sections, ordinance of 5 September 2024, registered as no. 202\/2024<\/strong>).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the employee\u2019s incapacity to understand and act (natural incapacity) \u2013 being purely subjective and internal \u2013 has consistently been considered irrelevant for the running of the forfeiture period. The period starts inexorably from the moment the dismissal letter is delivered, regardless of whether the employee is able to comprehend its content or respond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United Sections further excluded the possibility of protecting the incapacitated employee under Article 428 c.c.<\/strong>, which governs the annulment of acts carried out by persons lacking capacity. The rationale is that Article 428 c.c. applies to commissive acts<\/strong> (e.g., signing a contract). The failure to challenge a dismissal, instead, is an omissive conduct<\/strong>, a \u201cfailure to act\u201d in defense of one\u2019s rights, to which the rule cannot extend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Jurisprudence has always justified this strict interpretation by balancing the interests at stake. On one side, there is the employee\u2019s right to job stability; on the other, the employer\u2019s interest in continuity and stability of business management<\/strong>. Imposing a short forfeiture period serves this latter interest, preventing organizational decisions from remaining in uncertainty for an extended period. Forfeiture, in this perspective, is not a sanction for inaction, but the objective consequence of failing to meet a procedural obligation designed to protect economic relationships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, the legal and jurisprudential framework can be described as \u201crigid\u201d<\/strong>, built on three pillars:<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is precisely against the rigidity of this consolidated system that the ordinance of the United Sections of the Supreme Court<\/strong> is directed. While acknowledging its internal coherence and purpose of certainty, the referring Court questioned its compatibility with fundamental constitutional principles<\/strong> (reasonableness, equality, right to work, right to defense, and right to health) when applied to extreme situations of absolute and blameless incapacity<\/strong>, where the balance of interests is manifestly disproportionate against the employee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The constitutional question raised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling stems from a question raised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court in a case involving an employee dismissed while suffering from a severe illness, leaving her naturally incapable at the time of receipt of the dismissal and during the 60-day extrajudicial challenge period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The referring judge highlighted that the rigid application of the forfeiture period, insensitive to the employee\u2019s subjective condition, could violate multiple constitutional provisions, including:<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.delucapartners.it\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/shutterstock_1241697943-1024x683.jpg\")
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