{"id":25611,"date":"2025-06-06T07:26:13","date_gmt":"2025-06-06T05:26:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.delucapartners.it\/news\/abrogazione-del-rito-fornero-disciplina-transitoria-2\/"},"modified":"2026-04-08T11:36:33","modified_gmt":"2026-04-08T09:36:33","slug":"abrogazione-del-rito-fornero-disciplina-transitoria","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.delucapartners.it\/en\/insights\/normativa\/repeal-of-the-fornero-procedure-transitional-provisions\/","title":{"rendered":"Repeal of the \u201cFornero\u201d procedure: transitional provisions"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

With the recent ruling no. 11344 dated April 30, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court clarified that judicial proceedings initiated under the so-called \u201cFornero<\/a>\u201d<\/em> procedure prior to February 28, 2023, continue to be governed\u2014even in the appeal stages\u2014by the provisions established by that procedure, notwithstanding its repeal under the so-called \u201cCartabia<\/em>\u201d reform.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The facts and the first instance decisions<\/strong> <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The dispute originated from the challenge to a dismissal brought by a worker employed before March 2015 and thus covered by the protections of Article 18 of the Workers\u2019 Statute (i.e. \u201cStatuto dei Lavoratori\u201d<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To fully understand the matter and the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in the ruling under review, it is necessary to reconstruct the procedural phases, including their chronological sequence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The dismissal was challenged in October 2021 by filing a claim pursuant to Article 1, paragraphs 47 et seq., of Law no. 92\/2012 (the so-called Fornero<\/em> law). By order dated November 9, 2022, the Court of First Instance dismissed the claim, thus concluding the preliminary phase. The employee then filed an opposition against this order, which the Court of first istance rejected by judgment dated June 6, 2023. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

About six months later, on December 1, 2023, the claimant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal, submitting an appeal (rather than the prescribed complaint) against the Court of first istance judgment following the opposition phase. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court of Appeal declared the appeal late and thus inadmissible, as it was filed within six months instead of within the thirty-day term required for the complaint. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court of first istance interpreted Articles 35 and 37 of Legislative Decree no. 149 of 2022\u2014which regulate, respectively, the transitional discipline and the repeal of the Fornero<\/em> procedure\u2014holding that the repeal applies only to proceedings initiated after February 28, 2023, and that the case at hand, having been initiated prior to that date, remained governed by the previous procedural provisions, namely Article 1, paragraphs 47 et seq., of Law no. 92\/2012. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The Supreme Court appeal and decision<\/strong> <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Against this ruling, the employee appealed to the Supreme Court, advancing a single ground of appeal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The claimant argued that, once the repeal of the Fornero<\/em> procedure was enacted by the Cartabia<\/em> reform, the complaint procedure could no longer survive. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This argument was based on the combined reading of the first and fourth paragraphs of Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Cartabia<\/em> reform, which\u2014as noted\u2014govern the transitional phase between the old and the new procedural rules. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Specifically, the first paragraph provides that, \u201cunless otherwise provided,\u201d the new provisions apply to proceedings initiated after February 28, 2023; the claimant interpreted an exception to this rule in the subsequent fourth paragraph of the same Article 35, which states that the new provisions \u201capply to appeals filed after February 28, 2023.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Italian Supreme Court, rejecting the employee\u2019s appeal, confirmed the correctness of the lower courts\u2019 interpretation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Starting from a literal analysis of the legislative amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that the application of the new provisions to appeals filed after February 28, 2023, is limited to those governed by the ordinary civil procedure (namely, Chapters I and II of Title III, Book II of the Italian Code of Civil procedure) and to those relating to the generality of labor disputes subject to the ordinary labor procedure (Articles 434, 436-bis, 437, and 438 of the Code of Civil procedure). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Article 35, paragraph 4, does not extend its scope to the complaint, which is a specific form of appeal within the so-called Fornero<\/em> procedure, a procedure to which Article 35 makes no reference. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Supreme Court further emphasized that this interpretation is consistent with the general principle of perpetuatio iurisdictionis, according to which civil proceedings are governed in their entirety by the procedure in force at the time the claim is filed. The principle of \u201ctempus regit actum\u201d<\/em>, which means that supervening laws apply immediately to procedural acts considered individually, does not apply to the entire set of systematically organized procedural rules guiding the judicial decision, as this would violate the principle of non-retroactivity of the law set forth in Article 11 of the preliminary provisions to the Civil Code, of which Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an expression. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It follows that proceedings pending under the Fornero Procedure as of February 28, 2023, remain governed\u2014even during the appeal phase\u2014by the provisions laid down in Article 1, paragraphs 47 et seq., of Law no. 92 of 2012, whose repeal (Article 37, Legislative Decree no. 149 of 2022) applies only to proceedings initiated after February 28, 2023. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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