In judgment no. 23486 of 18 July 2026, the Joint Chambers of the Italian Supreme Court (i.e. “Corte di Cassazione”) held that the natural incapacity of an employee receiving a dismissal notice is not capable of overcoming the presumption of knowledge set forth under Article 1335 of the Italian Civil Code. The Supreme Court stated that such presumption is based on the receipt of the notice at the recipient’s address and on its objective knowability, regardless of the recipient’s subjective condition.
The case arose from the disciplinary dismissal of an employee for unjustified absence from work. The dismissal notice had been duly received by the employee, who had signed the acknowledgement of receipt. Only afterwards did the employee challenge the dismissal, claiming that, during the relevant period, she had been in a state of natural incapacity caused by a severe psychiatric condition, which allegedly prevented her from understanding the contents and consequences of the notice received.
Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal found that the employee’s right to challenge the dismissal had lapsed. They held that the time limit provided for by Article 6 of Law No. 604/1966 is not subject to suspension or interruption and that the recipient’s natural incapacity does not affect the effectiveness of receptive declarations.
The matter was subsequently referred to the Joint Chambers in order to clarify whether a state of natural incapacity, judicially established and undisputed between the parties, could be relied upon to rebut the presumption of knowledge under Article 1335 of the Italian Civil Code.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. In particular, it recalled that the rules governing receptive declarations are based on the principle of receipt and that what matters is not the recipient’s actual knowledge of the notice, but rather its objective knowability. According to the Joint Chambers, the legal presumption established by Article 1335 of the Italian Civil Code reflects a legislative choice aimed at ensuring legal certainty.
The Court therefore stated that “the evidence capable of rebutting the presumption (…) must likewise concern objective circumstances and relate not to the recipient’s subjective condition, but rather to external and objective factors”. Consequently, the recipient’s natural incapacity cannot be taken into account to exclude the objective knowability of the notice and, therefore, cannot rebut the presumption of knowledge under Article 1335 of the Italian Civil Code.
The Joint Chambers further clarified that attributing relevance to natural incapacity for the purpose of determining when the forfeiture period begins to run would effectively introduce a ground for suspension that is not contemplated by law.
The decision is of particular interest to employers, as it confirms that, for the purposes of the presumption of knowledge applicable to receptive declarations, only objective circumstances relating to the receipt of the notice and its objective knowability are relevant, whereas the recipient’s subjective conditions remain irrelevant.