Analysis and Implications of Constitutional Court Ruling No. 111/2025, Which Also Introduces a New Factual Variable in Dismissal Litigation: the Employee’s Psycho-Physical Health Status
With ruling No. 111/2025, filed on 18 July 2025, the Constitutional Court delivered a significant decision in labor law, declaring the partial constitutional illegitimacy of Article 6, first paragraph, of Law No. 604 of 15 July 1966. The Court found unconstitutional the provision to the extent that it does not allow a worker who is in a state of incapacity of mind at the time of receiving the dismissal notice—or during the 60-day period for extrajudicial challenge—to be exempted from the obligation of prior extrajudicial contestation and to instead challenge the dismissal directly through judicial proceedings (or by requesting conciliation or arbitration) within 240 days from the communication of the dismissal.
To understand the scope of the Constitutional Court’s ruling, it is necessary to outline the regulatory and jurisprudential context in which it is situated.
The core of the legislation is found in Article 6 of Law No. 604 of 15 July 1966. In its current form—shaped by amendments first introduced by Article 32 of Law No. 183/2010 and later by Article 1, paragraph 38, of Law No. 92/2012—the provision structures dismissal challenges as a progressive process, marked by two temporal thresholds:
First Term (Extrajudicial Challenge): The employee must contest the dismissal “under penalty of forfeiture within sixty days of receiving written notice”. The challenge may be made “through any written act, including extrajudicial, suitable to make the employee’s intention known”.
Second Term (Judicial Action): The extrajudicial challenge is considered “ineffective if not followed, within the subsequent one hundred and eighty days, by filing a claim with the labor court registry or by notifying the other party of a request for conciliation or arbitration”.
Failure to comply with even a single one of these deadlines results in the forfeiture of the right to challenge the dismissal and, consequently, in the stabilization of its effects, preventing the employee from seeking either reinstatement or the merely compensatory remedies provided by the special legislation.
The classification of the term as a “forfeiture period” is of crucial importance. Pursuant to Article 2964 of the Italian Civil Code, forfeiture is neither subject to interruption nor suspension, unless otherwise provided. This general principle renders the dismissal challenge period impervious to personal circumstances that would normally suspend the running of time, such as illness. The rationale behind this rule is to require the exercise of a right within a predetermined and brief timeframe, thereby crystallizing an otherwise uncertain legal situation.
The 60-day period (dies a quo) begins from the “receipt” of the dismissal notice. Since dismissal is a unilateral communicative act, its effectiveness and the commencement of the related deadlines are governed by Article 1335 of the Civil Code, which establishes a presumption of knowledge:
“A proposal, acceptance, revocation, or any other declaration addressed to a specific person is deemed known at the moment it reaches the recipient’s address, unless the recipient proves that, without fault, they were unable to have knowledge of it.”
It is precisely the interpretation of this provision that underpins the established jurisprudential orientation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s rulings, dating back to early decisions such as Cass. no. 5563 of 1982, have interpreted these rules in a rigorous and formalistic manner, prioritizing legal certainty.
The dominant approach follows the so-called “theory of receipt” or “theory of knowability”. Under this interpretation, what matters for the effectiveness of the act is not the actual knowledge of the recipient, but its mere knowability, which is presumed at the moment the act reaches the recipient’s address.
As a direct consequence, the rebuttal allowed under Article 1335 c.c. (“impossibility of knowledge without fault”) cannot relate to the recipient’s subjective conditions.
As highlighted by the United Sections in the ordinance referring the matter to the Constitutional Court:
“The evidence suitable to overcome the presumption must therefore concern circumstances not related to the recipient’s subjective conditions but to external and objective factors, concerning the connection between the individual and the place of delivery, sufficient to exclude the knowability of the act” (Cass., United Sections, ordinance of 5 September 2024, registered as no. 202/2024).
Therefore, the employee’s incapacity to understand and act (natural incapacity) – being purely subjective and internal – has consistently been considered irrelevant for the running of the forfeiture period. The period starts inexorably from the moment the dismissal letter is delivered, regardless of whether the employee is able to comprehend its content or respond.
The United Sections further excluded the possibility of protecting the incapacitated employee under Article 428 c.c., which governs the annulment of acts carried out by persons lacking capacity. The rationale is that Article 428 c.c. applies to commissive acts (e.g., signing a contract). The failure to challenge a dismissal, instead, is an omissive conduct, a “failure to act” in defense of one’s rights, to which the rule cannot extend.
Jurisprudence has always justified this strict interpretation by balancing the interests at stake. On one side, there is the employee’s right to job stability; on the other, the employer’s interest in continuity and stability of business management. Imposing a short forfeiture period serves this latter interest, preventing organizational decisions from remaining in uncertainty for an extended period. Forfeiture, in this perspective, is not a sanction for inaction, but the objective consequence of failing to meet a procedural obligation designed to protect economic relationships.
In summary, the legal and jurisprudential framework can be described as “rigid”, built on three pillars:
It is precisely against the rigidity of this consolidated system that the ordinance of the United Sections of the Supreme Court is directed. While acknowledging its internal coherence and purpose of certainty, the referring Court questioned its compatibility with fundamental constitutional principles (reasonableness, equality, right to work, right to defense, and right to health) when applied to extreme situations of absolute and blameless incapacity, where the balance of interests is manifestly disproportionate against the employee.
The constitutional question raised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court
The Constitutional Court’s ruling stems from a question raised by the United Sections of the Supreme Court in a case involving an employee dismissed while suffering from a severe illness, leaving her naturally incapable at the time of receipt of the dismissal and during the 60-day extrajudicial challenge period.
The referring judge highlighted that the rigid application of the forfeiture period, insensitive to the employee’s subjective condition, could violate multiple constitutional provisions, including:
The Supreme Court therefore requested the Constitutional Court to issue an additive ruling, making the forfeiture period run not from the receipt of the dismissal, but from the moment the employee regains capacity to understand and act.
Continue reading the full version published at Il Modulo 24 Contenzioso Lavoro.
In its recent Judgment No. 2385 of June 5, 2025, the Court of first instance of Catania reaffirmed that, in cases challenging the validity of a dismissal allegedly communicated orally, the burden of proof lies with the employee, in accordance with the general principles set out in Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code. The employee must demonstrate the constitutive fact of the claim – that is, that the termination of the employment relationship was the result of the employer’s intent to dismiss the worker.
The case examined by the Court of Catania involved a dispute raised by a Healthcare Assistant (i.e. “OSS”) against a social cooperative. The employee claimed to have been dismissed verbally after being accused of mistreating a patient. According to the employee’s account, the cooperative’s legal representative allegedly told him to “leave” without issuing any formal charge, in breach of Article 7 of the Workers’ Statute (Law No. 300/1970).
The employee asked the court to declare the dismissal null and ineffective, to order reinstatement, and to require the company to pay back and future wages and social security contributions.
The employer, though entering the case late, entirely denied the employee’s version of events. It claimed no dismissal had ever occurred – neither verbal nor written – and that the employee had voluntarily walked off the job after a meeting in which his alleged behavior was discussed. The company argued that the employment relationship was still ongoing, noting that no formal notice of termination had been submitted to the relevant authorities.
Thus, the central legal issue before the Court was the burden of proof regarding the oral dismissal.
The Court of Catania dismissed the employee’s claim, finding that the alleged oral dismissal was not proven.
The decision is based on Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code, which places the burden of proof on the party asserting the claim. In this case, the judge stated that the employee must prove not just that the employment ended, but that it was due to the employer’s intent to terminate, either explicitly or through conclusive conduct.
The Court highlighted that merely ceasing work is a “neutral fact with multiple interpretations”, which could stem from dismissal, resignation, or mutual agreement. Citing established case law from the Supreme Court (e.g., Judgments No. 3822/2019, No. 13195/2019, and No. 149/2021), the judge stressed that the employee must prove an “employer’s act consciously aimed at removing the worker from the production environment”.
In this case, the Court found that the employee failed to meet this burden of proof, citing:
Ultimately, due to this “evidentiary uncertainty”, the Court rejected the claim. Legal costs were fully offset between the parties due to the case’s complexity and the nature of the parties involved.nale ha rigettato la domanda del lavoratore che non era riuscito a dimostrare il fatto costitutivo della sua pretesa, ossia l’estromissione per volontà datoriale. Le spese di lite sono state integralmente compensate tra le parti in ragione della peculiarità della fattispecie e della natura delle parti in causa.
With Judgment No. 25167 of July 9, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – Third Criminal Division – reiterated that, in order to establish the criminal offense of fraudulent tax return through the use of invoices for non-existent transactions (Article 2, Legislative Decree No. 74/2000), it is necessary to verify not only the awareness of the falsity of the transaction (i.e. general intent), but also the specific purpose of evading taxes.
In the case at hand, the director of a company had been convicted for having included in the tax return invoices related to a service contract deemed only formally such but actually used to conceal an illicit labor supply (i.e. “somministrazione illecita di manodopera”).
However, the Supreme Court found that the challenged ruling lacked any reasoning regarding the mental element of the offense, merely asserting the circumvention of contribution and contractual obligations, without any investigation into the taxpayer’s evasive intent.
Recalling a well-established legal principle (see Supreme Court Judgment No. 37131/2024), the Court emphasized that verifying the specific intent is essential, as it constitutes the qualifying subjective element of the offense. The mere use of invoices related to a fictitious contract – which masks a different economic operation – is not sufficient, in the absence of proof that the taxpayer knowingly pursued an undue tax saving.
In conclusion, the annulment with referral to the Court of Appeal of Perugia confirms the need, in tax criminal matters, for a rigorous assessment of fraudulent intent, which cannot be automatically inferred from the civil reclassification of the contractual relationship.
Other related insights:
On 21 July 2025, judgment no. 118/2025 was filed, in which the Constitutional Court declared the partial constitutional illegitimacy of Article 9, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree no. 23/2015 (the so-called “Jobs Act”).
The ruling introduces significant changes in the protection against unlawful dismissal for employees of employers who do not meet the employment requirements set out in Article 18, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Workers’ Statute (so-called “sub-threshold employers”).
The contested provision (Article 9, paragraph 1, Legislative Decree 23/2015) provided for employees unlawfully dismissed by sub-threshold employers exclusively monetary protection, establishing that the amount of compensation provided for the various cases of unlawful dismissal (Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the same legislative decree) was to be halved compared to the compensation guaranteed to employees of companies with more than 15 employees and, in any case, could not exceed the limit of six months’ salary.
The Court held that the maximum limit of six months’ salary did not allow for “personalisation of the damage suffered by the worker” and did not constitute an effective deterrent against unlawful dismissals, violating the principles of reasonableness, equality and protection of employment (Articles 3, 4, 35, 41 and 117 of the Constitution).
Consequently, with the ruling in question, the Council declared the constitutional illegitimacy of this provision limited to the words ‘and may not in any case exceed the limit of six months’ salary.’ As a result, while the mechanism of halving the amounts remains in force, the maximum limit of six months’ salary no longer applies.
The Court’s intervention significantly expands the discretion of the judge, who may now award – in favour of employees hired after 7 March 2015 by employers below the threshold – compensation exceeding six months’ salary and up to a maximum of 18 months’ salary, commensurate with the specific circumstances of the case. The judge must take into account not only length of service but also other criteria such as the size of the employer’s economic activity (which, as emphasised by the Court, is not limited to the number of employees), the behaviour and conditions of the parties, thus ensuring that compensation is “personalised”.
The decision is consistent with the previous ruling no. 183/2022, in which the Court, although it had declared the questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 9, paragraph 1, of Legislative Decree 23/2015 inadmissible at the time, had nevertheless already identified a flaw in the relevant legislation and called for legislative action. In view of the inaction of the legislator, the Court decided that it could not wait any longer and took direct action to remove the most critical aspect of unconstitutionality.
As hoped for by the Court itself, future intervention by the legislator remains necessary in order to comprehensively review the criteria for identifying small businesses, supplementing the number of employees with indicators that are more representative of the employer’s real economic strength, such as turnover or total balance sheet.
With Ordinance No. 15987 of 2025, the Italian Court of Cassation established that a dismissal notice is presumed to be known by the recipient at the moment it is delivered to their residential address, even if the employee is not actually informed.
The case at hand concerns a dismissal imposed due to absolute and permanent unfitness for work, communicated to the employee by registered letter sent to their residential address. Specifically, the dismissal letter, properly delivered, was collected by the employee’s mother, who lived with him, and who decided not to hand it over to her son in order to protect him from potential psychological repercussions that the news of the dismissal might cause. Consequently, the employee challenged the dismissal after the statutory deadline of 60 days from receipt of the communication, invoking as justification for the late challenge the lack of knowledge of the dismissal.
However, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of Bologna (second-instance judgment) declared the appeal inadmissible, due to the expiration of the challenge period, considering the communication received at the employee’s address to be fully valid. They relied on a legal presumption of knowledge, based on the substantial legal equivalence between “knowledge” and “knowability” in relation to the delivery of an act to the recipient’s domicile.
The Court of Cassation subsequently confirmed this interpretation, reaffirming that, under Italian law, there is a legal presumption of knowledge of acts: an act is deemed to be known when it reaches the recipient’s address. This presumption can only be rebutted in the presence of objective obstacles beyond the employee’s control, such as natural disasters, serious postal disruptions, or prolonged absences due to force majeure, but not by subjective factors attributable to the recipient.
In conclusion, the ruling reiterates that, under Italian law, the deadlines to contest a dismissal are strict and start from the moment the communication reaches the employee’s address, even in cases where subjective factors prevent the employee from becoming aware of the disciplinary measure imposed on them.
