1. Inquadramento normativo del diritto di critica
2. I limiti giurisprudenziali al diritto di critica
3. Conseguenze del travalicamento dei limiti: profili disciplinari
4. Il diritto di critica del rappresentante sindacale.
1. Inquadramento normativo del diritto di critica
DISCIPLINA NORMATIVA
Il diritto di critica del lavoratore si configura quale specifica manifestazione della libertà di pensiero garantita dall’art. 21 della Costituzione, espressione della personalità morale del soggetto che si realizza anche all’interno del rapporto di lavoro. Tale diritto trova altresì fondamento nell’art. 2 Cost., che tutela la dignità e i diritti inviolabili della persona nei rapporti sociali, e, in prospettiva sovranazionale, negli artt. 10 CEDU (che ribadisce come “Ogni persona ha diritto alla libertà d’espressione”) e 11 della Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, che sanciscono la libertà di espressione come elemento essenziale della cittadinanza democratica.
Tuttavia, in coerenza con la natura relativa e bilanciata dei diritti fondamentali, il diritto di critica incontra limiti derivanti dalla necessità di contemperarlo con altri valori di rango costituzionale: da un lato, la tutela dell’onore, della reputazione e della dignità della persona (artt. 2 e 3 Cost.); dall’altro, la libertà di iniziativa economica privata (art. 41 Cost.), che non può essere compromessa da condotte espressive lesive dell’immagine o della funzionalità dell’impresa.
Nel rapporto di lavoro subordinato, l’esercizio della libertà di manifestazione del pensiero è riaffermato dall’art. 1 dello Statuto dei lavoratori, il quale sancisce “il diritto dei lavoratori, nei luoghi in cui prestano la loro opera, di manifestare liberamente il proprio pensiero”.
La necessità di contemperare tale libertà col rispetto dei principi della Costituzione e delle norme dello Statuto medesimo è ulteriormente condizionata dalla posizione di eterodirezione e fiducia che lo connota. Gli obblighi di diligenza e fedeltà, previsti dagli artt. 2104 e 2105 c.c., impongono al lavoratore un comportamento conforme ai canoni di correttezza e lealtà, estendendo tale dovere anche alla sfera extralavorativa quando le esternazioni del dipendente risultino potenzialmente idonee a ledere gli interessi morali o economici del datore di lavoro.
FOCUS GIURISPRUDENZIALE
| Diritto di critica – Definizione – Fondamento normativo“Il diritto di critica trova fondamento nella nostra Costituzione, che all’art. 21, riconosce a tutti il diritto di manifestare liberamente il proprio pensiero con la parola, lo scritto e ogni altro mezzo di diffusione, e nell’art. 10 della Cedu che ribadisce come “Ogni persona ha diritto alla libertà d’espressione”. L’art. 1 dello Statuto dei lavoratori riafferma “il diritto dei lavoratori, nei luoghi in cui prestano la loro opera, di manifestare liberamente il proprio pensiero”, e la necessità di contemperare tale libertà col rispetto dei principi della Costituzione e delle norme dello Statuto medesimo.Il diritto di critica si esercita attraverso la esternazione di un giudizio o, più genericamente, di un’opinione che, per sua natura, è frutto di un’interpretazione soggettiva e personale di fatti e comportamenti. La manifestazione del pensiero in chiave critica reca con sé, di regola, un giudizio negativo, di disapprovazione dei comportamenti altrui o di dissenso rispetto alle opinioni altrui e possiede, quindi, una incomprimibile potenzialità lesiva nei confronti del destinatario, del suo onore e della sua reputazione. Come si è osservato, qualunque critica rivolta ad una persona è idonea ad incidere sulla sua reputazione e, tuttavia, escludere il diritto di critica ogniqualvolta leda, sia pure in modo minimo, la reputazione altrui, significherebbe negare il diritto di manifestare liberamente il proprio pensiero (v. Cass. n. 12420 del 2008; n. 1434 del 2015; n. 38215 del 2021). La necessità di un contemperamento del diritto di critica con il diritto, di pari rilevanza costituzionale, all’onore e alla reputazione, impone l’osservanza di determinati limiti” (Cass. 28 febbraio 2025, n. 5331)“La manifestazione del pensiero in chiave critica reca con sé, di regola, un giudizio negativo, di disapprovazione dei comportamenti altrui o di dissenso rispetto alle opinioni altrui e possiede, quindi, una incomprimibile potenzialità lesiva nei confronti del destinatario, del suo onore e della sua reputazione” (Cass. 24 aprile 2025, n. 10864) |
2. I limiti giurisprudenziali al diritto di critica
DISCIPLINA NORMATIVA
La giurisprudenza, nel tentativo di bilanciare i contrapposti interessi, ha elaborato tre criteri fondamentali che la critica del lavoratore deve rispettare per essere considerata legittima: la pertinenza, la continenza sostanziale e la continenza formale. Il superamento di tali limiti può configurare un illecito disciplinare e, nei casi più gravi, costituire giusta causa di licenziamento.
La giurisprudenza fonda la propria elaborazione su un necessario bilanciamento tra diritti fondamentali contrapposti, quali:
1. Fonti costituzionali:
Continua a leggere la versione integrale pubblicata su Il Modulo 24 Contenzioso Lavoro.
In Provision No. 288 of May 21, 2025, the Italian Data Protection Authority fined an Italian company €420,000 for unlawful processing of an employee’s personal data later used to justify her dismissal.
The employee filed a complaint against the company, alleging improper use of her personal data extracted from her “Facebook” profile, the “Messenger” app, and certain chats from the “WhatsApp” platform. These data, made known to the company, were used to support two separate disciplinary notices.
In the first notice, dated February 16, 2024, the company quoted the contents of some comments made by the complainant on her Facebook profile, including quoted excerpts and descriptions of certain photos. In the second notice, dated March 21, 2024, it referred to a conversation on Messenger between the complainant and a third party (not employed by the company) who forwarded the conversation to the company via WhatsApp, including quoted excerpts. This second notice also included excerpts from a WhatsApp message the complainant sent to some colleagues on February 22, 2024.
Referring to Article 8 of Law No. 300/1970 (the Italian Workers’ Statute), which prohibits the employer from carrying out investigations – including via third parties – into an employee’s political, religious, or trade union opinions, as well as facts irrelevant to assessing the employee’s professional aptitude, the company claimed it had played no active role in collecting the data. It argued that the information had been reported to it and could therefore be used for disciplinary purposes, as this would not constitute a prohibited investigation under the Workers’ Statute.
The Italian Data Protection Authority used the occasion to recall that:
– The legal system protects the freedom and confidentiality of communications, recognized as fundamental rights, and any limitation is allowed only “by reasoned decision of the judicial authority, in accordance with the law” (Article 15 of the Constitution). This presumption of confidentiality, as clarified by the Constitutional Court, extends to all communication tools made available by technological evolution. (Lawfulness principle)
– The mere publication of data on publicly accessible platforms, such as social networks, does not imply that the data subject has given general consent for the free use of that data for any purpose. A specific legal basis is required for any processing other than the original purpose. (Purpose limitation principle)
– The need for data processing based on legitimate interest – the justification cited by the company in its defense – must also be evaluated under the principle of minimization. The data controller must verify that “the legitimate interest pursued cannot reasonably be achieved through less harmful means for the fundamental rights of data subjects, particularly their right to privacy”. In this case, the company failed to demonstrate that it had assessed the impact of the processing on the employee’s rights or considered less intrusive alternatives, even though the disciplinary measures could have been based on other elements. (Data minimization principle)
The Authority clarified that while it is not tasked with evaluating the disciplinary facts themselves, it is the employer – as the data controller – who must assess not only the lawfulness but also the adequacy, relevance, and proportionality of the data processing to be carried out. The Authority found numerous violations by the company, which, “once it became aware that the transmitted data concerned private communications and comments on a closed Facebook profile, […] should have refrained from using them.”
Other related insights:
With Ordinance No. 15987 of 2025, the Italian Court of Cassation established that a dismissal notice is presumed to be known by the recipient at the moment it is delivered to their residential address, even if the employee is not actually informed.
The case at hand concerns a dismissal imposed due to absolute and permanent unfitness for work, communicated to the employee by registered letter sent to their residential address. Specifically, the dismissal letter, properly delivered, was collected by the employee’s mother, who lived with him, and who decided not to hand it over to her son in order to protect him from potential psychological repercussions that the news of the dismissal might cause. Consequently, the employee challenged the dismissal after the statutory deadline of 60 days from receipt of the communication, invoking as justification for the late challenge the lack of knowledge of the dismissal.
However, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of Bologna (second-instance judgment) declared the appeal inadmissible, due to the expiration of the challenge period, considering the communication received at the employee’s address to be fully valid. They relied on a legal presumption of knowledge, based on the substantial legal equivalence between “knowledge” and “knowability” in relation to the delivery of an act to the recipient’s domicile.
The Court of Cassation subsequently confirmed this interpretation, reaffirming that, under Italian law, there is a legal presumption of knowledge of acts: an act is deemed to be known when it reaches the recipient’s address. This presumption can only be rebutted in the presence of objective obstacles beyond the employee’s control, such as natural disasters, serious postal disruptions, or prolonged absences due to force majeure, but not by subjective factors attributable to the recipient.
In conclusion, the ruling reiterates that, under Italian law, the deadlines to contest a dismissal are strict and start from the moment the communication reaches the employee’s address, even in cases where subjective factors prevent the employee from becoming aware of the disciplinary measure imposed on them.
On 20 February 2025, Decree-Law No. 6/2025, known as the ‘Decreto Milleproroghe’, was definitively approved by the Chamber of Deputies, which once again intervenes on fixed-term contracts, in particular on the reasons justifying such temporary employment relationships.
The Decree extends until 31 December 2025 the possibility for private employers to enter into fixed-term contracts exceeding 12 months, and in any case not exceeding 24 months, also for needs of a technical, organisational or productive nature, if not already provided for by collective agreements.
This provision applies to all sectors, with an initial application that could affect the tourism sector, pending updates of the relevant collective agreements.
Other related insights:
Italian Law 104/1992 grants employees paid leave to assist family members with disabilities, with the cost covered by INPS (the National Institute for Social Security). However, misuse of this benefit has led to judicial investigations to identify potential violations of the law. Case law has helped clarify what constitutes abuse.
The law grants leave for caregiving but does not clearly define the conditions under which its use becomes abusive. In general, courts have adopted a broad interpretation, stating that caregiving includes all tasks a disabled person cannot perform independently, not just personal assistance at home.
In a recent ruling (October 10, 2024, no. 26417), the Italian Supreme Court clarified that caregiving does not require constant presence at the family member’s home, but can include errands, as long as they are aimed at the disabled person’s well-being. The Court also confirmed that using leave outside working hours does not count as abuse, since the leave is granted on a daily, not hourly, basis.
In another ruling (September 9, 2024, no. 24130), the Court stated that personal activities, as long as they do not interfere with caregiving, are not considered abusive. However, if the employee engages in activities far from caregiving, such as going to the beach instead of assisting a family member (Cass. Civ., Labor Section, June 16, 2021, no. 17102), it is considered misuse, and the employer can take disciplinary action, including dismissal for just cause.
Employers can hire investigative agencies to check for abuse, but these investigations must be conducted within legal boundaries, respecting the employee’s privacy.
Continue reading the full version published in Il Sole 24 Ore.
