The Corrective Decree on Public Procurement (Legislative Decree No. 209/2024), which came into force on December 31, 2024, was introduced to provide greater protection for workers employed in outsourced activities, as well as to ensure increased transparency regarding their economic and contractual conditions.
The Corrective Decree amended and supplemented Legislative Decree No. 36/2023 (Public Contracts Code), establishing, among other things, the obligation for contracting authorities to specify, at all stages of the tendering procedures, the applicable national collective labor agreement for the personnel employed under the contract.
Similarly, it was established that in the case of contracts that include separable, secondary, ancillary, or subsidiary services, where such services differ from the main subject matter of the contract or concession and represent, for a threshold equal to or greater than 30%, the same homogeneous category of activity, the contracting authority must indicate in the tender documents “the national and territorial collective labor agreement in force for the sector and for the area where the work is to be performed, signed by the most representative employers’ and workers’ associations at the national level, applicable to the personnel engaged in such services.”
Also of significance is the amendment to Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Code, which clarifies that the verification of the declaration of equivalence of protections relating to the personnel employed in the contract, submitted by the economic operator, must be carried out in accordance with the procedures set out in Article 110 of the Code and in line with the new provisions of Annex I.01. Equally relevant is the amendment to Article 119, paragraph 12, which provides that in the case of subcontracting, “the subcontractor… is required to apply the same collective labor agreement as the main contractor, or a different agreement, provided that it guarantees employees the same economic and regulatory protections as the one applied by the main contractor, where the subcontracted activities coincide with those that characterize the subject matter of the contract or concern the services falling under the prevailing category.”
In practice, according to Annex I.01, agreements signed by the same trade unions (that are comparatively more representative), even if concluded with different employers’ associations from those that signed the collective agreement indicated by the contracting authority, are presumed to be equivalent. However, this presumption of equivalence applies only insofar as the collective agreement pertains to the same sub-sector and is “corresponding to the size or legal nature of the undertaking.”
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Italian Law 104/1992 grants employees paid leave to assist family members with disabilities, with the cost covered by INPS (the National Institute for Social Security). However, misuse of this benefit has led to judicial investigations to identify potential violations of the law. Case law has helped clarify what constitutes abuse.
The law grants leave for caregiving but does not clearly define the conditions under which its use becomes abusive. In general, courts have adopted a broad interpretation, stating that caregiving includes all tasks a disabled person cannot perform independently, not just personal assistance at home.
In a recent ruling (October 10, 2024, no. 26417), the Italian Supreme Court clarified that caregiving does not require constant presence at the family member’s home, but can include errands, as long as they are aimed at the disabled person’s well-being. The Court also confirmed that using leave outside working hours does not count as abuse, since the leave is granted on a daily, not hourly, basis.
In another ruling (September 9, 2024, no. 24130), the Court stated that personal activities, as long as they do not interfere with caregiving, are not considered abusive. However, if the employee engages in activities far from caregiving, such as going to the beach instead of assisting a family member (Cass. Civ., Labor Section, June 16, 2021, no. 17102), it is considered misuse, and the employer can take disciplinary action, including dismissal for just cause.
Employers can hire investigative agencies to check for abuse, but these investigations must be conducted within legal boundaries, respecting the employee’s privacy.
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With sentence No. 148, published in the Official Gazette on 31 July 2024, the Constitutional Court declared the illegitimacy of Article 230-bis, third paragraph, of the Civil Code, in the part that does not include the ‘de facto cohabitee’ among the participants in the family business.
The ruling originates from the claim made by the cohabitee of a farm owner, later deceased, to obtain from the latter’s heirs the payment of her share in the family business, in which she claimed to have worked continuously for about eight years.
The Court emphasised that while there are still some differences of discipline with respect to the family based on marriage, when it comes to fundamental rights, these must be recognised for all, without distinction of any kind.
On the basis of these premises, the Court therefore declared the rule unconstitutional due to the failure to include the de facto cohabitee in the list of participants in the family business.
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The Supreme Court, by its decision no. 28171 of 31 October 2024, confirmed the validity of a dismissal notified to the employee’s previous address if the employee did not promptly notify the employer of his change of residence or domicile.
The employee, challenging the dismissal, challenged the validity of the notification made to his original address, arguing that, because of his transfer, that notification should be considered invalid.
The Court, rejecting the appeal, ruled that “the dismissal sent to the known address is fully effective, if done within the prescribed time limits”, as it is the worker’s responsibility to notify any change of residence or domicile in writing, as stipulated by the NCBAs and by the principle of good faith that governs the employment relationship. In particular, the Supreme Court referred to Article 1335 of the Civil Code, which states that a communication is deemed to be known at the time it is sent to the known address, and clarified that the employee’s failure to communicate the change of residence does not affect the validity of the notification. This principle was also extended to the letter of disciplinary notice, which is therefore to be considered fully effective once it reaches the employee’s original address.
In its order no. 26440 dated October 10, 2024, the Court of Cassation, Labor Section, reaffirmed the legitimacy of the dismissal imposed on an employee who had addressed a client in a rude and vulgar manner, once again underscoring the boundaries of judicial review in determining “just cause” for termination.
The judicial proceedings originated from the disciplinary dismissal of an employee assigned to the butcher counter of a supermarket, who had been accused by the employer of addressing an elderly customer with aggressive and inappropriate language.
While the court of first instance upheld the employee’s challenge to the dismissal, the Court of Appeal of Cagliari reversed this decision, confirming the legitimacy of the dismissal order.
In this case, the appellate court considered the employee’s behavior a serious breach of his contractual obligations, particularly the duty to “use courteous manners with the public and maintain a conduct consistent with civic duties,” warranting disciplinary dismissal pursuant to Article 215 of the collective bargaining agreement for employees in the Tertiary, Distribution, and Services sector, which governed the employment relationship.
The Court specifically emphasized the seriousness of the employee’s conduct, noting that the counter attendant, on that occasion, not only failed to apologize to the elderly customer but also escalated the argument with increasingly heated tones, resulting in what was described as “an undignified and somewhat concerning scene.” In assessing the appropriateness of the dismissal, the Court of Appeal also took into account the employee’s prior disciplinary record from the preceding two years. Although these prior incidents were not specifically similar, they highlighted a pattern of repeated non-compliance with company rules, rendering the continuation of the employment relationship unsustainable.
In the ruling under discussion, the Court of Cassation, by rejecting the employee’s appeal against the Cagliari Court’s decision, seized the opportunity to consolidate its stance and reaffirm certain prevailing principles concerning termination for just cause under Article 2119 of the Civil Code.
In particular, the Court of Cassation observed that “just cause,” understood as conduct that precludes even temporary continuation of the employment relationship, falls within the scope of so-called general clauses—normative provisions of limited and general content that require judicial specification in interpretation, “through consideration of both external factors relating to general societal awareness and principles implicitly referenced by the provision itself.”
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