With order no. 27132 of October 9, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – Labor Division – ruled that a company receiving a “single inspection and notification report” (i.e “verbale unico di accertamento e notificazione”) issued by the Italian Labor Inspectorate has a legitimate interest in bringing an action to annul it, even in the absence of subsequent measures by the Italian National Social Security Institute (i.e. “INPS”), whenever the report contains findings that may lead to social security contribution recoveries.
A company challenged before the Court of first instance of Florence an inspection report issued following checks carried out at one of its construction sites, arguing that the report caused concrete prejudice, particularly concerning its contribution status with the INPS. The first instance Court dismissed the claim as inadmissible for lack of standing, holding that the report had no immediate adverse effects.
The company appealed, but the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision. According to the appellate judges, the Labor Inspectorate’s report merely recorded the alleged violations and forwarded the file to the competent bodies, without creating any concrete contribution obligation: only a subsequent measure by the INPS could have generated an actual and concrete interest in judicial review.
The Supreme Court upheld the company’s appeal, quashed the appellate decision, and remanded the case to the Court of Florence for a new examination. According to the Court, the “single inspection and notification report” cannot be regarded as a neutral act or one without legal effects, as it establishes violations that may lead to contribution recoveries by social security bodies.
Consequently, the employer faces a concrete risk of losing contribution compliance status and, as a result, being unable to obtain the DURC (i.e. “Documento Unico di Regolarità Contributiva”, i.e. the certificate of social security compliance) or to participate in public tenders.
The Court clarified that this reasoning differs from that followed in administrative sanction matters, where the standing to act arises only upon the issuance of the injunction order. In the field of social security, however, Article 24, paragraph 3, of Legislative Decree no. 46/1999 expressly recognizes the admissibility of a negative declaratory action against a report containing a contribution claim.
Denying such standing would violate Article 100 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure and Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, as it would prevent judicial protection against an act capable of producing adverse legal consequences.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that whenever an inspection report contains findings capable of leading to contribution recoveries, the recipient has a legitimate interest in bringing a negative declaratory action to remove uncertainty regarding the existence and the actual nature of the employment relationship. Such interest is concrete because it serves to prevent the suspension of the right to obtain the DURC and, ultimately, to avoid the emergence of contribution obligations that the employer would subsequently be required to meet.
With order no. 24991 of September 11, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that the rules governing electronic resignations and the related right of revocation, set out in Article 26 of Legislative Decree no. 151/2015, also apply where the resignation and the subsequent revocation occur during the probationary period (i.e. “patto di prova”).
The dispute arose from an employment relationship established on September 4, 2019, which included a probationary period clause. The following day, September 5, 2019, the employee submitted his resignation, only to revoke it on September 12, 2019, within the seven-day time limit provided by law. The employer, however, did not consider the revocation effective.
The employee therefore brought the matter before the Labor Court, which upheld the claim, declared the revocation valid, and ordered the company to reinstate the worker so that the probationary period could be completed.
The decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, seized by the employer.
The judges of merit based their ruling on the wording of Article 26 of Legislative Decree no. 151/2015, which regulates electronic resignations. They observed that the law expressly excludes its application only to certain categories of employment (domestic work, employment in public administrations) or to particular procedures (resignations formalized before labor authorities), without mentioning the probationary period. The Court of Appeal also considered irrelevant Ministry of Labor Circular no. 12/2016, which had suggested the exclusion of resignations during probation from the electronic procedure, qualifying it as an internal administrative act with no binding legal force for the judiciary, since it introduced a derogation not provided for by primary legislation. The company appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, with the order under review, dismissed the employer’s appeal, fully confirming the decision of the lower courts and providing important clarification on the scope of the electronic resignation procedure.
First, the Court addressed the applicability of Article 26 of Legislative Decree No. 151/2015 to resignations during probation. It reiterated that the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 7 and 8-bis of the law are exhaustive and must be strictly interpreted. Since the probationary period is not included among them, the general rule, including the right of revocation within seven days, must be regarded as fully applicable. The Court also rejected the employer’s reliance on the ministerial circular, stressing the non-binding nature of such acts for the judiciary and specifying that, in this case, the circular went beyond mere interpretation, attempting to alter the legislative text.
The Court further emphasized the different ratio of the two institutions: the probationary period aims to protect the parties’ common interest in testing the employment relationship, while Article 26 of Legislative Decree No. 151/2015 seeks to combat the phenomenon of so-called “blank resignations” (i.e. “dimissioni in bianco”, undated resignation letters unlawfully pre-signed by employees at the time of hiring) and to ensure the authenticity of the worker’s will. According to the Court, these purposes do not conflict but operate on distinct levels.
Second, the Supreme Court rejected the employer’s argument regarding the consequences of revocation. The company argued that even if the revocation were effective, the worker would only be entitled to damages, not reinstatement, given the free terminability of the employment relationship during probation under Article 2096 of the Italian Civil Code.
The Court refuted this argument, noting that the case law limiting remedies to damages applies only to cases of unlawful termination by the employer during probation. In this case, instead, the issue concerned the employee’s resignation, which was rendered null and void ex tunc by a timely and valid revocation. The revocation, exercised within the statutory period, removes the resignation from the legal sphere, as if it had never been made. As a result, the employment relationship was never interrupted. The company’s order to reinstate the worker for completion of the probationary period was therefore confirmed by the Supreme Court, without prejudice to the right of either party to terminate during probation once it has lasted long enough.
With Order No. 24994 of September 11, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court – labor division – clarified that although the employer has a duty to actively seek solutions to preserve the job of a worker who has become medically unfit, this obligation does not extend to imposing unreasonable organizational changes or creating positions that are not genuinely useful to the business.
In the case at hand, a female worker employed as a bartender, following a road accident, had been declared by the occupational physician fit to work but with significant restrictions: “total exclusion from manual handling of loads, exclusion from prolonged standing, cannot provide table service, should preferably be assigned to a seated position”. The employer, a company managing a hotel with bar and restaurant service, dismissed her for supervening medical inability to work, claiming it was impossible to reassign her to other compatible tasks.
The Court of Appeal, confirming the first-instance ruling, rejected the challenge to the dismissal. It held that the worker lacked the skills required for alternative roles (cook, receptionist, administrative staff) and that the other tasks available were incompatible with her health conditions, also ruling out the possibility of adopting reasonable accommodations.
The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the employee’s appeal, confirming the legitimacy of the dismissal. The Supreme Court reiterated the established principle that, in cases of dismissal for supervening medical inability to work, the employer must prove not only the impossibility of assigning the worker to compatible tasks (i.e. the so-called repêchage obligation, meaning the duty to attempt reassignment), but also the impossibility of adopting “reasonable organizational accommodations”, pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 3-bis, of Legislative Decree no. 216/2003. The burden of proof regarding the existence of a justified reason for dismissal lies entirely with the employer, who must demonstrate having made a diligent and reasonable effort to identify an appropriate organizational solution.
The Supreme Court further clarified that the assessment of the “reasonableness” of accommodations is a matter of fact, which can only be challenged before the Supreme Court for defects in reasoning. In this case, the Court of Appeal had carried out a detailed review of possible alternatives: assigning the worker to bar service, even with scheduled breaks, would still have required periods of standing incompatible with medical restrictions; assigning her to cashier duties, although theoretically a seated role, would have required administrative tasks beyond her professional expertise, resulting in an unreasonable alteration of the company’s organizational structure. Such options, imposing a disproportionate burden on the business, cannot be considered reasonable accommodations.
In conclusion, the ruling reaffirms that the duty of social solidarity and the protection of workers in cases of supervening medical inability to work require the employer to take an active role in seeking solutions to preserve employment. However, this obligation is not unlimited. Where the employer proves, as in this case, that any possible adaptation would entail a disproportionate burden or an unreasonable alteration of the company’s organization, dismissal for justified objective reason (i.e. giustificato motivo oggettivo) must be deemed lawful.
The Supreme Court Upholds the Dismissal for Just Cause of an Employee Who Used Parental Leave to Work at His Wife’s Seaside Resort Instead of Caring for His Children
Parental leave, governed by Article 32 of Legislative Decree no. 151/2001, is an instrument designed to protect parenthood, conceived to allow working parents to devote time to caring for their child in the early years of life, meeting the child’s emotional and relational needs. However, although this right is characterized as a prerogative right (diritto potestativo), it is not without limits, and its exercise is strictly bound to the purpose for which it was established. With its recent order no. 24922, issued on 9 September 2025, the Court of Cassation once again addressed the sensitive issue of the abuse of this measure, confirming the legitimacy of dismissal for just cause imposed on an employee who had used parental leave for purposes other than caring for his children.
The case originated from the disciplinary dismissal imposed by a company on one of its employees for abusing parental leave.
The Court of Appeal of Reggio Calabria, overturning the first-instance decision, upheld the lawfulness of the termination, finding that the employee, during his period of absence from work (specifically on 9, 14, 15, and 16 August 2019), had engaged in work activities at the seaside resort managed by his wife, thereby neglecting the direct care of his children and, in particular, of his three-year-old child. According to the Court of Appeal, such conduct distorted the very purpose of the measure, even making it necessary to resort to external help to compensate for his absence, in clear conflict with the purpose of parental leave, which is to foster the father–child relationship. Against this ruling, the employee lodged an appeal before the Court of Cassation.
The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal in its entirety, providing important clarifications on the limits of the exercise of the right to parental leave and on the reviewability of abusive conduct.
The Court reiterated that parental leave is a prerogative right (diritto potestativo), the exercise of which, however, is not arbitrary but functionally oriented toward the direct care of the child. Engaging in any other activity not strictly related to this purpose constitutes an abuse of rights and a breach of the principle of contractual good faith, both towards the employer—who is unjustly deprived of the employee’s performance and suffers a breach of trust—and towards the social security institution, through the undue receipt of benefits and the diversion of welfare support from its intended purpose.
In its reasoning, the Court also referred, by analogy, to its well-established case law on leave granted under Law no. 104/1992 (among many: Cass. no. 12679/2024, no. 6468/2024, no. 25290/2022, no. 1394/2020). In this regard, the Supreme Court affirmed that the episodic nature of the conduct is irrelevant: any deviation from the legitimate purpose is sufficient to constitute a serious misconduct capable of irreparably undermining the fiduciary relationship between employee and employer.
Indeed, the principles set forth are paradigmatic in delineating the boundaries of abuse of rights and in qualifying the conduct of employees who use protective measures granted by law for purposes unrelated to those for which they were provided.
Verification of such abuses often takes place through targeted monitoring, in particular by investigative agencies. On this point, case law is clear: Article 4 of the Workers’ Statute prohibits any form of direct surveillance of work activity but permits defensive checks aimed at verifying fraudulent conduct unrelated to the performance of work duties.
For example, the Court of Cassation (most recently, Order of 12 February 2025, no. 3607) upheld the dismissal for just cause of an employee who, after clocking in, left the workplace to attend to personal matters, ascertained through a private investigator. Similarly, with Order of 30 January 2025, no. 2157, the Court held that the use of investigative agencies to verify abuse of leave under Law no. 104/1992 is lawful, provided there are well-founded suspicions and the investigations are proportionate and non-invasive.
Thus, investigative monitoring is lawful if limited and justified: it may never become generalized surveillance but must have as its sole objective the verification of conduct detrimental to the company’s interests or to the enterprise’s reputational assets (Cass. no. 30079/2024).
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In the absence of proof of the employer’s intention to terminate, a claim of ineffectiveness of an oral dismissal must be rejected
The Court of Catania, in its recent judgment no. 2385 of 5 June 2025, reiterated that a claim challenging a dismissal, where the ineffectiveness of the measure is alleged on the grounds that it was communicated orally, places on the employee—pursuant to the general principles set out in Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code—the burden of proving the constitutive fact of the claim, namely that the termination of the employment relationship is attributable to the employer’s intention to remove the worker.
This ruling aligns with a now well-established line of case law, reaffirming with clarity the governing principles and offering a rigorous application of evidentiary rules.
As is well known, individual dismissal is a unilateral and receptive act subject to a mandatory form requirement: under penalty of ineffectiveness, it must be communicated in writing.
This fundamental principle is unequivocally set out in Article 2 of Law No. 604 of 15 July 1966, which states that “the employer, whether or not an entrepreneur, must notify the employee of the dismissal in writing.”
Written form is required ad substantiam, meaning as an essential requirement for the validity of the termination itself. Its absence results in the most severe legal consequence: the ineffectiveness of the dismissal, as expressly provided for in the third paragraph of the same article.
This means that a dismissal communicated only verbally is considered tamquam non esset—as if it had never occurred—and is therefore entirely incapable of producing the terminating effect on the employment relationship.
The rationale underlying this mandatory rule lies in the need to ensure certainty in legal relationships, to enable the employee to mount a full and informed defense through judicial challenge, and to guarantee that the employer’s decision to terminate is formalized in a clear and permanent manner.
While the substantive legal provision is clear, its practical application raises a crucial procedural issue when the employee turns to the court claiming to have been excluded from the workplace following nothing more than an oral communication.
In this scenario, resolution of the dispute shifts to the evidentiary level, governed by the general rule set out in Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code, according to which “the party who wishes to assert a right in court must prove the facts on which the claim is based.”
Continue reading the full version published on Il Modulo 24 Contenzioso Lavoro.
