By order no. 87 of 3 January 2024, the Italian Court of Cassation ruled on the applicability of reinstatement where the fact underlying the dismissal ordered for justified objective reasons did not exist.
At the end of the three instances of proceedings, the Italian Court of Cassation upheld the appeal brought by the dismissed employee, quashing the judgment of the Court of Appeal which had only granted the employee compensation amounting to 20 months’ salary.
The case originates from a worker’s dismissal by a cooperative company for a justified objective reason, based on the need for a company reorganisation and the consequent outsourcing of accounting activities (the department to which the worker was assigned).
The first instance Court had upheld the worker’s appeal, declaring the dismissal unlawful.
The Court of Appeal of Catanzaro, in agreement with the first instance Court, rejected the appeal lodged by the employer cooperative, on the ground that the latter had not proved the existence: (i) of the causal link between the reorganisation and the abolition of the job; (ii) the elimination of the department to which the worker had previously been assigned; (iii) the impossibility of the worker’s relocation.
On the basis of these assumptions, the Court of Appeal judges had ordered the employer to pay the worker compensation equal to 20 months’ salary.
The worker then appealed to the Italian Court of Cassation asking for reinstatement under Article 18, paragraph 7, Italian Law no. 300/1970 (so-called Workers’ Charter).
The Court of Cassation, in accepting the appeal filed by the worker, reiterated that the burden of proof regarding the existence of the conditions for dismissal for justified objective reasons is placed on the employer who can also resort to presumptions, with the exception that the burden is on the worker to prove the assignable posts (Italian Court of Cassation 20 October 2017, no. 24882).
With the ruling in question, the Court also addressed the issue of the “manifest” non-existence of the fact justifying, under Article 18, paragraph 7 of the Workers’ Charter, as amended by Italian Law no. 92/2012, the application of the mitigated obligation of reinstatement.
According to the Court, the assessment as to whether the fact is manifestly non-existent must be independent from the character of immediate evidence, “due to the fact that Article 18, paragraph 7, second sentence of Italian Law no. 300/1970, as amended by Article 1, paragraph 42, letter b) of Italian Law no. 92/2012, was declared constitutionally unlawful, for breach of Article 3 of the [Italian] Constitution, limited to the word ‘manifest’”.
The Italian Court of Cassation agreed with the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Catanzaro on the non-existence of the “organisational reorganisation used as the basis of the dismissal” as well as on the absence of proof of the impossibility of fulfilling the repêchage obligation (obligation to relocate). However, the Italian Court of Cassation concluded that, in the present case, the justified objective reason cited at the basis of the dismissal did not exist. The Court of Cassation criticised the compensation order stating that the Court of Appeal had disregarded over-riding legal principles in the light of the latest rulings on the requirement of “manifest” non-existence.
In summary, according to the Italian Court of Cassation, if there is no causal link between the employer’s dismissal and the justified objective reason adduced as its basis, there is a manifest non-existence of the fact that, as such, justifies ordering the employer to reinstate the employee.
With Order no. 31660 of 14 November 2023, the Italian Court of Cassation ruled on a dismissal for a justified objective reason based on the need to cut costs. In this case, the employer had not demonstrated that the costs savings should be those specifically relating to the dismissed worker’s position rather than other positions that were more “expensive” than the one affected by the dismissal. The Italian Court of Cassation, hearing the case, established that for the purposes of ascertaining the lawfulness of a dismissal because of a general need to cut costs, the reasons why the employer chose a particular worker must be assessed. In this regard it is also necessary to consider other job positions, especially if they are comparable to the one abolished, to verify the existence of the causal link between the alleged organisational reason and the abolition of the job. Following the majority approach, the Court therefore ruled that if the dismissal for a justified objective is imposed to cut costs, the burden is on the employer to indicate the reasons why the particular worker has been chosen. .
The Court of Trieste, Employment Section, with order of 21 December 2023, no. 525/2023 has held that so-called “vulnerable” workers’ rights to work remotely cannot be “absolute” but must be balanced with the company’s organisational and production needs as envisaged by the employer.
In the present case, a “vulnerable” employee worked remotely five days a week, under an individual fixed-term agreement. At the end of the agreed term, the employer informed the employee that, due to changed business and organisational needs, she would have to work for three days a week in person and, for the remaining two days, remotely.
In the face of this, the worker complained about the incompatibility of her state of health with in-person work, arguing the the tasks assigned to her were absolutely compatible with remote working – also taking into account that in the last three years she had carried them out entirely remotely – and highlighting the unlawfulness of the employer’s conduct for breach of Article 2087 of the Italian Civil Code.
The employer challenged the application and claimed that it was unfounded for alleged breach of the company’s freedom of organisation, protected by Article 41 of the Italian Constitution. The employer justified the refusal to allow the employee to work entirely remotely on the basis of proven organisational reasons and reiterated the need for her presence in the workplace for at least three days a week.
The Court highlighted that the right to remote working granted to “vulnerable” workers (see Article 90, paragraph 1, of Italian Decree-Law no. 34/2020) is not an absolute right but a right expressly subordinated to the compatibility of the worker’s tasks being carried out remotely.
The Court also acknowledged that the ways in which the employer exercised its power to organise the company appeared real and appropriate and that the possibility of working remotely, albeit partially, was never denied but rather partially granted following a balancing and re-evaluation of the parties’ mutual needs.
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In conclusion, it can be said that the assessment of the compatibility of remote working by vulnerable workers must be carried out on the basis of the organisational and production needs of the concerned organisation, involving, where necessary, an inevitable need to alternate between days in which the worker must work in-person and days when he/she can work remotely. This reading, among others, is consistent with the provisions of Article 18 of Italian Law no. 81/2017 which, in defining remote working, provides for that work should be provided “partly inside company premises and partly outside”.
Other related insights:
In its very recent judgment no. 2274 of 23 January 2024, the Italian Court of Cassation ruled that it is lawful for an employer to give notice of a second dismissal pending a judgment concerning a previous dismissal based on different grounds. However, the second dismissal has no effect if the first dismissal is declared lawful by a final judgment.
An employee, pending proceedings relating to a first dismissal, brought legal proceedings challenging a second disciplinary dismissal imposed on him by his employer.
The proceedings relating to this second dismissal were settled by the so-called ‘summary phase’ of the Fornero Proceedings with the annulment of the dismissal as only one of the alleged facts had been proven.
Both the employee and the employer appealed against the summary phase order.
The two sets of appeal proceedings were not joined and ended with two separate judgments, both declaring the invalidity of the supervening second dismissal. This was because, pending those judgments, the first instance court had held the first dismissal to be lawful and, subsequently, the Court of Appeal, again with reference to the first dismissal, had declared the worker’s appeal inadmissible.
The two judgments delivered in the context of the appeal phase relating to the second dismissal were appealed against by both the employer and the employee.
The Court of Appeal – following the intricate procedural sequence of events summarised above – declared the second dismissal invalid on the basis that there had been a judgment, albeit not final, which had affirmed the lawfulness of the first dismissal.
The employer appealed to the Italian Court of Cassation against the Court of Appeal’s decision.
Pending the appeal to the Italian Court of Cassation proceedings relating to the second dismissal, that court also ruled on the first dismissal, confirming its lawfulness.
In the judgment under discussion, the Italian Court of Cassation judges therefore noted, preliminarily, the loss of interest on the part of the employer in insisting on the annulment of the ruling declaring the invalidity of the second dismissal, because such ineffectiveness was now to be considered confirmed by the final judgment.
It was only to rule on the costs of the proceedings that the Italian Court of Cassation upheld the employer’s appeal on the following grounds.
In the first place, the Court ruled that, in an employment relationship, the employer, if it has already given the employee notice of dismissal, may lawfully give notice of dismissal for a second time, based on a different ground or reason, because the latter is completely autonomous and distinct from the first.
According to the Italian Court of Cassation judges, both acts of withdrawal are in themselves theoretically sufficient to achieve the purpose, since the second dismissal is effective only in the event that the previous dismissal is held to be invalid or ineffective by a final judgment.
It follows that the Court of Appeal should have ruled on the lawfulness or otherwise of the second dismissal, since the judgment relating to the first dismissal had not – at the time – yet been concluded with a final judgment.
The Italian Court of Cassation, accepting the appeal brought by the employer, consequently ordered the employee to pay the legal costs of the proceedings.
Other related insights:
By Order no. 35527 of 19 December 2023, the Italian Court of Cassation ruled on the dismissal of a working mother ordered as a result of the cessation of the employer’s business activity following a declaration of bankruptcy, holding it to be void and ordering the employer to reinstate the employee and pay financial compensation.
In this case, the worker was dismissed by the receiver, shortly after returning from the period of compulsory maternity leave and before her child turned one year old, due to the declaration of bankruptcy of the Cooperative, her employer.
The worker challenged the dismissal before the Court of Arezzo claiming that the dismissal was void as notice was given within a year of her son’s birth. The Court accepted the worker’s claim, declared the dismissal null and void and ordered the receiver to reinstate the employee and to pay her compensation commensurate with her final salary.
The receiver appealed the decision to the Florence Court of Appeal, which confirmed the first instance judgment.
The Italian Court of Cassation, hearing the case, examined the concept of “cessation of business activity” provided for by Article 54, paragraph 3, letter b) of Italian Legislative Decree no. 151/2001 as one of the exceptions from the general prohibition on the dismissal of working mothers within a year of the birth of their child.
In particular, the Court examined the scenario in which the interim continuation of the business activity is not ordered with the bankruptcy ruling, nor subsequently authorised by the bankruptcy judge, in a context in which, after the bankruptcy, “it had been demonstrated that the liquidation activities had not begun and that, instead, protective activities were underway for the purpose of transfer to third parties (which is why a selection process of personnel to be retained in service was being carried out)”.
The Court noted that, from a comparison of the bankruptcy legislation and Article 54, the judgment declaring bankruptcy implies the formal cessation of the business activity (except for any authorised interim continuation), while the concept of cessation underlying Article 54 has a different scope.
In the Court’s opinion the exception to the prohibition on dismissal in the event of “cessation of the business activity” operates only in those cases in which there is no possibility, for whatever reason, of the continuation of the business. The Court noted that this is based on the over-riding protection of the rights of the mother-worker with respect to financial rights, which are safeguarded by the equal treatment of creditors principle in bankruptcy proceedings.
In recalling previous rulings on the topic, the Court, with the judgment in question, clarified that the exception provided for by Article 54 is subject to “precise and circumscribed limits” and that “because the termination of the relationship is an extraordinary or necessary event”, the exception cannot be interpreted expansively (Italian Court of Cassation no. 13861/2021). Therefore, the Court concluded, the exception to the prohibition on dismissal operates when the following two conditions are met: (i) the employer is a company and (ii) there is cessation of the business activity, with the burden of proof falling on the employer.
In the present case, in light of the fact that the business activity of the bankrupt Cooperative could not be said to have ceased, the worker’s dismissal was not considered to comply with the legal principles mentioned above and, for this reason, was therefore considered unlawful.