In the very recent ruling No. 11344 of April 30, 2025, the Supreme Court clarified that judicial proceedings introduced under the so-called Fornero Rite before February 28, 2023 continue to be governed, even in the appeal stages, by the provisions dictated by the same rite, although the same was repealed by the so-called Cartabia Reform.
The so-called “Fornero rite” had been introduced by Law No. 92/2012 (Art. 1, paragraphs 47 – 69) to address the need to ensure celerity in the resolution of dismissal disputes.
While the legislator’s intentions were shareable, from the first applications the genetic flaws of that normative translation had become apparent.
In fact, the Fornero rite, applicable only to dismissals governed by Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute, implied that the judicial claim could only concern the legitimacy of the dismissal and issues “based on the same constituent facts.” This led, on the one hand, to interpretive doubts about the claims admissible under this rite and, on the other, to a fractioning of judicial claims related to the employment relationship, resulting in an inevitable proliferation of judicial litigation.
Reflection on the evident ineffectiveness of the Fornero rite, as to the possibility of explaining that prefigured deflative effect, had already led the legislature to its “applicative downsizing” by Legislative Decree No. 23/2015, which excluded its application to dismissals subject to the so-called “growing protections” regime, for all employment relationships established since March 7, 2015.
After all, the so-called. Fornero Rite had never been particularly appreciated by insiders and its repeal had also been proposed by the “Commission for the elaboration of proposals for interventions in the field of civil process and alternative instruments” (established at the Ministry of Justice by Ministerial Decree of March 12 March 2021) and this with the twofold aim of “simplifying and clarifying the regulatory framework of the procedural discipline in the matter of dismissals” and “overcoming the interpretative and applicative difficulties that Article 1, paragraphs 48 ff., of Law No. 92 of June 12, 2012, has caused to emerge since its introduction, with inevitable repercussions for the relationship between employer and employee.”
Continue reading the full version published on Guida al Lavoro.
With the recent ruling no. 11344 dated April 30, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court clarified that judicial proceedings initiated under the so-called “Fornero” procedure prior to February 28, 2023, continue to be governed—even in the appeal stages—by the provisions established by that procedure, notwithstanding its repeal under the so-called “Cartabia” reform.
The dispute originated from the challenge to a dismissal brought by a worker employed before March 2015 and thus covered by the protections of Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute (i.e. “Statuto dei Lavoratori”).
To fully understand the matter and the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in the ruling under review, it is necessary to reconstruct the procedural phases, including their chronological sequence.
The dismissal was challenged in October 2021 by filing a claim pursuant to Article 1, paragraphs 47 et seq., of Law no. 92/2012 (the so-called Fornero law). By order dated November 9, 2022, the Court of First Instance dismissed the claim, thus concluding the preliminary phase. The employee then filed an opposition against this order, which the Court of first istance rejected by judgment dated June 6, 2023.
About six months later, on December 1, 2023, the claimant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal, submitting an appeal (rather than the prescribed complaint) against the Court of first istance judgment following the opposition phase.
The Court of Appeal declared the appeal late and thus inadmissible, as it was filed within six months instead of within the thirty-day term required for the complaint.
The Court of first istance interpreted Articles 35 and 37 of Legislative Decree no. 149 of 2022—which regulate, respectively, the transitional discipline and the repeal of the Fornero procedure—holding that the repeal applies only to proceedings initiated after February 28, 2023, and that the case at hand, having been initiated prior to that date, remained governed by the previous procedural provisions, namely Article 1, paragraphs 47 et seq., of Law no. 92/2012.
Against this ruling, the employee appealed to the Supreme Court, advancing a single ground of appeal.
The claimant argued that, once the repeal of the Fornero procedure was enacted by the Cartabia reform, the complaint procedure could no longer survive.
This argument was based on the combined reading of the first and fourth paragraphs of Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Cartabia reform, which—as noted—govern the transitional phase between the old and the new procedural rules.
Specifically, the first paragraph provides that, “unless otherwise provided,” the new provisions apply to proceedings initiated after February 28, 2023; the claimant interpreted an exception to this rule in the subsequent fourth paragraph of the same Article 35, which states that the new provisions “apply to appeals filed after February 28, 2023.”
The Italian Supreme Court, rejecting the employee’s appeal, confirmed the correctness of the lower courts’ interpretation.
Starting from a literal analysis of the legislative amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that the application of the new provisions to appeals filed after February 28, 2023, is limited to those governed by the ordinary civil procedure (namely, Chapters I and II of Title III, Book II of the Italian Code of Civil procedure) and to those relating to the generality of labor disputes subject to the ordinary labor procedure (Articles 434, 436-bis, 437, and 438 of the Code of Civil procedure).
Article 35, paragraph 4, does not extend its scope to the complaint, which is a specific form of appeal within the so-called Fornero procedure, a procedure to which Article 35 makes no reference.
The Supreme Court further emphasized that this interpretation is consistent with the general principle of perpetuatio iurisdictionis, according to which civil proceedings are governed in their entirety by the procedure in force at the time the claim is filed. The principle of “tempus regit actum”, which means that supervening laws apply immediately to procedural acts considered individually, does not apply to the entire set of systematically organized procedural rules guiding the judicial decision, as this would violate the principle of non-retroactivity of the law set forth in Article 11 of the preliminary provisions to the Civil Code, of which Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an expression.
It follows that proceedings pending under the Fornero Procedure as of February 28, 2023, remain governed—even during the appeal phase—by the provisions laid down in Article 1, paragraphs 47 et seq., of Law no. 92 of 2012, whose repeal (Article 37, Legislative Decree no. 149 of 2022) applies only to proceedings initiated after February 28, 2023.
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With order no. 11765 of May 5, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that a non-compete agreement is null and void when it imposes excessively broad territorial restrictions and offers only minimal compensation—resulting in an unjustified and disproportionate limitation on the employee’s right to work and earn a living.
In the case at hand, a banking institution had required one of its employees to accept a particularly restrictive non-compete clause. The agreement prohibited the employee from engaging in any professional activity in the banking, insurance, or financial sectors—both within Italy and abroad—for a duration of 12 months. In return, the employee received compensation amounting to just 10% of their gross annual salary (i.e. “RAL”). The clause, as drafted, completely barred the individual from accessing the job market in their area of expertise.
The lower court had already ruled the agreement null and void, primarily due to the lack of defined—or even objectively determinable—territorial limits. This issue was further compounded by the employer’s unilateral right to modify the geographical scope of the restriction through the exercise of its discretionary power (i.e. “ius variandi”), thereby rendering the scope of the clause uncertain and unstable.
The Italian Supreme Court upheld that ruling, stating that under Articles 1346 and 2125 of the Italian Civil Code, a non-compete clause is valid only if the following conditions are met:
With specific regard to the territorial scope, the Supreme Court confirmed that the clause allowing the employer to unilaterally redefine the geographical boundaries made the agreement legally uncertain. The absence of predetermined or determinable limits undermined the enforceability of the clause and deprived the employee of any clear understanding of the restriction’s scope.
The Italian Supreme Court therefore confirmed that a valid non-compete agreement must reflect a fair balance between the employer’s legitimate business interests and the employee’s fundamental right to work. It must allow the employee a real and concrete opportunity to continue exercising their profession, and it must provide compensation that is adequate and proportionate to the burden imposed.
In conclusion, a non-compete clause that is overly punitive, lacks fair compensation, and deprives the employee of genuine professional alternatives will be deemed null and void, in line with the principles of contractual fairness, individual autonomy, and the free circulation of labor. ll’intero accordo, a tutela dell’autonomia professionale e della libera circolazione del lavoro.
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For influencers it is time for rules and consultants (ItaliaOggi7, 5 May 2025 – Alessandro Ferrari)As of 1 April this year, those who make content for the web are required to register with a new Ateco code. But there are many rules that must be respected in order to earn money on the web.
Influencers” and their correct classification: reflections in the light of INPS circular no. 44/25
Alessandro Ferrari, Senior Associate of our Firm, was interviewed by ItaliaOggi7 on the subject of influencers.
That of the influencer is a “new” profession that cannot be framed in any specific case provided for by the Civil Code.
Translated with DeepL.com (free version)
Therefore, with increasing frequency, the problem of identifying the correct contractual classification arises in practice.
Continue reading the full version of the interview published in ItaliaOggi here.
With the recent ruling no. 9282 of April 8, 2025, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that the legislation on individual dismissals (Law 604/1966, amended in 2010) applies to probationary employees only when the employment becomes permanent or at least six months have passed since the start of the employment relationship.
A company decided to terminate the employee’s contract during the probationary period for failing to pass the probationary evaluation.
The employee contested the probationary termination in compliance with the extrajudicial appeal period, requesting a conciliation attempt (which was rejected by the employer), but failed to respect the deadline for filing the judicial appeal.
The Court of Appeal of Venice, confirming the first-instance judgment, ruled that the employee’s appeal was filed beyond the expiration period set forth by Article 6 of Law 604/1966. According to this rule, a dismissal appeal is ineffective if not followed by the filing of the judicial appeal within sixty days after the failure of the conciliation attempt.
The employee appealed the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Italian Supreme Court, arguing that Law 604/1966 was not applicable in this case, as Article 10 of the same law (amended by Law 183/2010) states that dismissal regulations apply only once the employment becomes permanent or at least six months have passed from the beginning of the employment relationship.
The Italian Supreme Court, in ruling no. 9282/2025, upheld the employee’s appeal, stating that the judges of the court of first instance had erroneously applied the individual dismissal regulations (Article 6 of Law 604/1966) without considering the specific nature of the probationary employment relationship.
The Supreme Court clarified that termination during the probationary period does not fall under the statutory deadlines for dismissals as established by Article 6 of Law 604/1966 and Article 32 of Law 183/2010.
This is due to the fact that the probationary agreement has a distinct nature, intended to allow both parties to evaluate the mutual suitability of the employment relationship, and as such, it is governed by a more flexible framework.
In these situations, the Supreme Court explained, the standard five-year statute of limitations applies, rather than the more rigid deadlines set for ordinary dismissals.
As a result, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision and sent the case back to the Court of first-instance for further consideration, taking into account the specific circumstances surrounding the termination during the probationary period.
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