Italian Law 104/1992 grants employees paid leave to assist family members with disabilities, with the cost covered by INPS (the National Institute for Social Security). However, misuse of this benefit has led to judicial investigations to identify potential violations of the law. Case law has helped clarify what constitutes abuse.
The law grants leave for caregiving but does not clearly define the conditions under which its use becomes abusive. In general, courts have adopted a broad interpretation, stating that caregiving includes all tasks a disabled person cannot perform independently, not just personal assistance at home.
In a recent ruling (October 10, 2024, no. 26417), the Italian Supreme Court clarified that caregiving does not require constant presence at the family member’s home, but can include errands, as long as they are aimed at the disabled person’s well-being. The Court also confirmed that using leave outside working hours does not count as abuse, since the leave is granted on a daily, not hourly, basis.
In another ruling (September 9, 2024, no. 24130), the Court stated that personal activities, as long as they do not interfere with caregiving, are not considered abusive. However, if the employee engages in activities far from caregiving, such as going to the beach instead of assisting a family member (Cass. Civ., Labor Section, June 16, 2021, no. 17102), it is considered misuse, and the employer can take disciplinary action, including dismissal for just cause.
Employers can hire investigative agencies to check for abuse, but these investigations must be conducted within legal boundaries, respecting the employee’s privacy.
Continue reading the full version published in Il Sole 24 Ore.
Article 33 of Law 104/1992 regulates paid leave ‘for the assistance, social integration and rights of disabled persons’.
These permits consist in the possibility for public or private, full-time or part-time employees to be absent from work, while retaining the right to remuneration and figurative contribution coverage for pension purposes, in order to assist a disabled person in a situation of seriousness, who is not hospitalised on a full-time basis.
A ‘disability in a situation of seriousness’, pursuant to Article 3(3) of Law 104/1992, is defined as a single or multiple impairment that has reduced personal autonomy, related to age, in such a way as to require permanent, continuous and comprehensive assistance in the individual sphere or in the sphere of relationships.
Continue reading the full version in Modulo Contenzioso 24 of Il Sole 24 Ore.
In its decision of January 9, 2025, no. 460, the Italian Supreme Court ruled on the dismissal of a disabled executive for economic reasons, stating that the discriminatory nature of the dismissal is not excluded by the presence of another valid reason, such as the elimination of the position due to company restructuring.
An executive, dismissed due to company restructuring and the elimination of her position, challenged the dismissal, claiming that the termination was discriminatory on the grounds of health and disability.
In the first instance and appellate proceedings, the judges confirmed the existence of an organizational reason for the dismissal, rejecting the executive’s appeal.
In particular, with regard to the alleged discriminatory dismissal on the grounds of health and disability, the Court of Appeal had deemed the appellant’s complaints to be unfounded.
Against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the executive filed an appeal with the Italian Supreme Court.
In upholding the employee’s appeal, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeal had wrongly stated that the dismissal could not be discriminatory due to the strong element of the reorganization reason established in the judgment, thus contradicting the “established case law, which instead shows that a dismissal can be, directly or indirectly, discriminatory even when a legitimate reason, such as an economic reason, is present”.
With regard to the burden of proof, the Italian Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeal had violated the standard of proof established by the legal system by shifting the entire burden of proof and pleadingto the employee, on the grounds that she had failed to provide the necessary elements to prove the discrimination.
On this point, the Italian Supreme Court clarified that “when the claimant provides factual elements, including statistical data, from which the existence of discriminatory acts, agreements, or behaviors can be presumed, the burden of proof lies with the defendant to demonstrate the non-existence of discrimination”.
For the above reasons, the Italian Supreme Court, upholding the employee’s appeal, overturned the contested judgment and referred the case back to the Court of Appeal of Rome, «which, in a different composition, will carry out a new examination, applying what has been established with regard to the discriminatory dismissal and its nullity».
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The Italian Supreme Court, with decision no. 170 dated January 7, 2025, was called to rule on the legitimacy of the dismissal of a disabled employee for exceeding the protected period.
Specifically, a disabled employee challenged the ruling of the Court of Appeal, which had determined that applying the same protected period for both non-disabled and disabled workers did not constitute indirect discrimination.
In this case, the Supreme Court stated that the employer, although fully aware of the employee’s disability, proceeded with the dismissal for exceeding the absence period, applying the same criteria used for non-disabled workers, without investigating whether the absences were related to the employee’s specific condition.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court deemed the objections raised by the employee to be well-founded, upheld the appeal, and rejected the contested ruling.
Moreover, the Court offered an interesting point of reflection, emphasizing “the need for collective bargaining agreements to explicitly address the issue of absence periods for disabled workers, taking into account their specific conditions, as merely considering absences due to certain illnesses or of a certain severity is not sufficient”.
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With sentence No. 148, published in the Official Gazette on 31 July 2024, the Constitutional Court declared the illegitimacy of Article 230-bis, third paragraph, of the Civil Code, in the part that does not include the ‘de facto cohabitee’ among the participants in the family business.
The ruling originates from the claim made by the cohabitee of a farm owner, later deceased, to obtain from the latter’s heirs the payment of her share in the family business, in which she claimed to have worked continuously for about eight years.
The Court emphasised that while there are still some differences of discipline with respect to the family based on marriage, when it comes to fundamental rights, these must be recognised for all, without distinction of any kind.
On the basis of these premises, the Court therefore declared the rule unconstitutional due to the failure to include the de facto cohabitee in the list of participants in the family business.
Continue reading the full version published on The Platform.
