The proper management of employer checks that can be carried out by an employer is an issue that has always been sensitive for companies today made even more relevant by the spread of increasingly advanced technologies and tools. Recent pronouncements of the Court of Cassation have reaffirmed some fundamental principles on the legitimacy of employer checks, whether through investigative agencies or through access to computer tools used by workers. It is therefore essential for employers to understand how to balance the protection of corporate interests with respect for employees’ privacy.
In the context of defensive controls, the employer may need to access company devices and work tools provided to employees such as, by way of example, laptops, telephones and e-mail boxes. On this subject, it is worth mentioning the latest ruling, in chronological order, of the Court of Cassation, which ruled on the legitimacy of employer controls carried out, specifically, through access to the e-mail box.
The Court of Cassation, in its Order No. 807 of 13 January 2025, reiterated that the employer may only access an employee’s company e-mail in the presence of a well-founded suspicion of wrongdoing. The check must therefore be justified by a concrete assumption of wrongdoing and cannot be conducted arbitrarily or retroactively.
This issue calls for important reflection on the subject of employer controls in a context in which new technologies have considerably broadened the possibilities of monitoring. It is therefore essential to clearly define the boundaries to be considered in order for the actions taken and any data collected to be considered legitimate and compliant with the current legal framework. If these boundaries are not respected, the consequence is that information that could confirm the commission of offences is unusable.
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Exceeding the sick leave period represents a delicate balance between employee rights and business needs. Over the years, case law has provided important guidance on the matter. What checks must the employer carry out, and what are the employee’s responsibilities?
The issue of exceeding the sick leave period is a key aspect of human resource management. On the one hand, employees suffering from serious or prolonged illnesses need sufficient time off to recover without losing their job. On the other hand, businesses must ensure operational continuity and may struggle to manage prolonged absences.
Managing the exceeding of the sick leave period requires a balanced and careful approach. Employers must verify compliance with contractual regulations and act in good faith, avoiding hasty or discriminatory measures.
Employees, in turn, have a duty to properly communicate their condition and comply with the rules set by their contract and the law. Over time, case law has provided essential guidance to balance these interests. However, only a case-by-case assessment can ensure the right equilibrium between employee protection and business needs.
The accrual period is mainly regulated by Article 2110 of the Civil Code, which states that in the event of illness, the employee has the right to keep his job for a period determined by collective agreements. Once this limit has been exceeded, the employer may terminate the relationship, subject to the right to compensation for notice.
Moreover, Law 300/1970 (Workers’ Statute) in Article 18 goes into the merits of the termination of employment: the rule protects the worker from dismissals announced in violation of Article 2110, second paragraph, of the Civil Code, providing the right to reinstatement in the workplace.
Over the years, several Supreme Court rulings have made headlines regarding the exceeding of the sick leave period and have clarified that the employer must consider the specific situation of the employee and evaluate possible alternatives before proceeding with dismissal.
In addition to the case that gained media attention of an employee dismissed when only a few days remained before the end of the sick leave period (Supreme Court Ruling No. 24766/2017), here are some rulings that have made history:
To avoid legal disputes, the employer must carry out careful checks before taking disciplinary measures. In particular, they must:
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The negative implications of criminally unlawful acts on the proper execution of work performance, in compliance with the employee’s obligations, constitute just cause for dismissal.
The Supreme Court, in ruling no. 31866 of December 11, 2024, established that unlawful conduct outside the workplace may have disciplinary relevance, as the employee is not only required to perform the assigned tasks but also, as an ancillary obligation, to refrain from engaging in behaviors outside the workplace that could harm the employer’s moral and material interests or compromise the relationship of trust. If such conduct is of a particularly serious nature, it may also justify dismissal for just cause.
As is well known, Article 2119 of the Civil Code defines just cause for termination as “a cause that does not allow the continuation, even temporarily, of the employment relationship.” This means an event, attributable to one of the parties, of such severity that any alternative to immediate termination would be inadequate to protect the interests of the terminating party.
The concept of just cause is rooted in the broad scope of its definition and is classified among the so-called “general clauses” (Supreme Court ruling no. 10964 of May 8, 2018). It is an open-ended concept that requires interpretation through the assessment of factual elements (including the evolution of social awareness and the perception of the severity of certain events) and legal considerations.
As stated by the Supreme Court, “just cause for dismissal is a concept that the law, in order to adapt regulations to a complex and ever-changing reality, defines through a provision (classified among the so-called general clauses) with limited content, outlining a generic model that requires specification through interpretation by considering both external factors related to general awareness and the principles implicitly referenced by the provision itself” (Supreme Court, September 30, 2022, No. 28515).
Moreover, it has been recently reaffirmed that the consideration of external factors related to general awareness is an integral part of the interpretative process (Supreme Court, August 22, 2024, No. 23029).
In outlining the types of employee behavior that may constitute just cause for dismissal, case law has established that the breach of trust may result either from a violation of contractual obligations or from off-duty conduct.
An employee is required not only to fulfill contractual obligations but also to adhere to ancillary behavioral duties, which, even outside the workplace, mandate the protection of the employer’s moral and financial interests. Violating these obligations undermines the trust necessary for the proper continuation of the employment relationship.
For example, in several cases, the courts have deemed violations of the so-called “minimum ethical standard” as just cause for dismissal. This refers to conduct that any reasonable person—including the employee—should recognize as contrary to the fundamental principles of civil coexistence, fairness, and good faith.
One significant case involved the dismissal for just cause of a school bus driver following a final criminal conviction for engaging in acts unequivocally aimed at causing the termination of his partner’s pregnancy. The Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the legitimacy of the dismissal, citing the objective severity of the offense and its social disvalue, which directly impacted the employer’s public image (Supreme Court, April 3, 2024, No. 8728).
Similarly, the off-duty possession of a significant quantity of narcotics for trafficking purposes was considered to seriously affect the employment relationship, particularly in terms of the employee’s future reliability. The Supreme Court ruled that an employee is required not only to perform their assigned tasks but also to refrain from behaviors—outside the workplace—that could compromise the trust-based relationship with the employer, which is subject to the assessment of the trial judge (Supreme Court, August 6, 2015, No. 16524).
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision, which had deemed the employee’s conduct particularly severe in terms of future reliability. The employee, a “chef de rang” at a thermal resort, was responsible for room service, a role involving frequent contact with guests. The court found the conduct even more serious given that the drugs were purchased from a colleague.
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According to Article 29, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree 276/2003 (known as the “Legge Biagi”), in the context of service contracts (“contratti di appalto” in Italian parlance), the principal company or employer is jointly and severally liable with the contractor, as well as with any subcontractors, within two years after the termination of the contract, for the payment of amounts owed to workers for work performed during the contract period, including:
However, joint and several liability does not apply to civil sanctions, for which only the defaulting party is responsible.
Consequently, in the context of service contracts, although the obligation to pay salaries and social security contributions falls on the contractor — the company directly hiring the workers and managing the service contract — Italian law assigns the principal a “guarantee” role regarding these obligations, introducing a genuine joint obligation on the principal.
In concrete, this guarantee allows workers to act against either the contractor or the principal to obtain payment of unpaid salaries owed for work performed under the service contract.
Moreover, the principal’s joint and several liability also applies to compensation and social security obligations of self-employment workers, pursuant to Article 9 of Legislative Decree 76/2013, converted with amendments into Law No. 99 of August 9, 2013.
The principal’s joint and several liability is subject to a two-year limitation period, starting from the termination of the contract. However, this two-year period applies exclusively to claims made by workers, while, according to case law, it does not apply to recovery actions initiated by social security or insurance institutions such as INPS (the Italian National Social Insurance Agency) or INAIL (the Italian National Institute for Insurance against Accidents at Work), which remain subject to a five-year statutory limitation period.
The principal, who, due to joint and several liability, has paid the workers the salaries or contributions owed, may seek recovery from the contractor under the general rules provided by the Civil Code. However, the principal can no longer invoke the benefit of prior enforcement against the contractor, as was allowed until 2017.
Finally, the Court of Cassation recently stated that joint and several liability between the principal and the contractor is not limited to contracts formally classified as “service contracts”. It applies whenever workers are employed in a mechanism of outsourcingwhere “detachment between the ownership of the employment relationship and the utilization of the labor activity was established, which could justify applying the guarantee provided by Article 29” (see Court of Cassation, Labor Section, order no. 26881 of October 16, 2024). Based on this principle, joint liability has been deemed applicable, for example, in cases of “department delegation contracts” (“affidamento di reparto” in Italian parlance) or supply contracts.
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Con l’ordinanza n. 26634 del 14 ottobre 2024, la Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro, ha affermato che il licenziamento per superamento del periodo di comportonon rientra nella previsione di nullità stabilita dall’art. 46, D.L. n. 18/2020 (c.d. “blocco” dei licenziamenti per emergenza pandemica da Covid-19) e ha, al contempo, precisato il corretto criterio di computo delle giornate di malattia per i lavoratori che operano in regime di part-time verticale.
Il caso esaminato dall’ordinanza in commento riguarda il licenziamento per superamento del periodo di comporto intimato, in data 25 novembre 2020, all’epoca della vigenza del “blocco” dei licenziamenti per emergenza Covid-19, ad una lavoratrice con contratto di lavoro subordinato a tempo parziale verticale al 50%, distribuito su tre giornate.
In particolare, il licenziamento veniva irrogato a fronte dell’assenza della lavoratrice dal posto di lavoro per malattia per 113 giorni nell’arco temporale tra il 6 agosto e il 25 novembre 2020, senza soluzione di continuità, come attestato dai sedici certificati medici emessi in sequenza a copertura dell’intero periodo.
Impugnato il licenziamento in sede giudiziale ritenendolo nullo in conseguenza del “blocco” imposto durante l’emergenza sanitaria, la lavoratrice risultava soccombente sia in primo che in secondo grado.
Specificamente, la Corte d’Appello di Roma – preliminarmente ritenuta, contrariamente al Tribunale, l’ammissibilità della domanda – rigettava il reclamo della lavoratrice affermando che, non potendosi applicare la previsione di nullità stabilita dall’art. 46, D.L. n. 18/2020 al licenziamento per superamento del periodo di comporto, avendo quest’ultimo natura diversa dal licenziamento per giustificato motivo oggettivo, e stante, comunque, il carattere speciale dell’art. 46, nel caso di specie il periodo di comporto era stato ampiamente superato, essendo la malattia proseguita per un periodo superiore al limite previsto dal CCNL applicato per la conservazione del posto di lavoro in caso di regime part-time di tipo verticale, pari alla metà delle giornate lavorative concordate tra le parti in un anno solare (78,5).
La lavoratrice proponeva quindi ricorso per Cassazione, censurando la decisione della Corte d’Appello per due motivi.
In primo luogo, per non avere la Corte territoriale esteso la nullità del divieto di licenziamento anche al recesso per superamento del periodo di comporto, in quanto riconducibile alla fattispecie del giustificato motivo oggettivo, per i riflessi delle assenze per malattia della lavoratrice sull’organizzazione aziendale.
In secondo luogo, per erronea individuazione del criterio di computo delle giornate di malattia in regime di part-time verticale, in violazione dei principi di proporzionalità e non discriminazione, per effetto di una riduzione della metà del numero delle giornate concordate, ma non anche del loro numero ai fini del computo delle giornate di malattia per il suo superamento.
La Corte di Cassazione ha respinto il ricorso della lavoratrice ritenendo entrambi i motivi di doglianza infondati.
In particolare, con riferimento al primo motivo, la Suprema Corte ha preliminarmente sottolineato come la natura di norma speciale dell’art. 46, D.L. n. 18/2020 (ispirato alla specifica ratio di tutela dei lavoratori dalle conseguenze negative sull’occupazione derivanti dal blocco o dalla riduzione dell’attività produttiva conseguente all’emergenza Covid-19) ne escluda l’applicabilità in via analogica.
Ad avviso della Corte, tale tesi sarebbe avvalorata anche dal fatto che, in altro recente giudizio di legittimità, la norma in esame è stata oggetto di ordinanza di rimessione alla Corte Costituzionale per contrasto con l’art. 3 Cost. Nello specifico, gli Ermellini hanno dubitato della ragionevolezza dell’art. 46 in considerazione del fatto che, pur non essendoci, ai fini del divieto, alcuna diversità tra licenziamento collettivo e licenziamento individuale, tale norma non include tra le fattispecie coperte dal “blocco” anche l’ipotesi di giustificatezza del licenziamento individuale dei dirigenti, ai quali tuttavia il divieto si applica in caso di licenziamento collettivo, creando, così, un ingiustificato difetto di simmetria sul piano della disciplina legale dei licenziamenti individuali e di quelli collettivi per i dirigenti. Se, dunque, l’applicazione analogica dell’art. 46 non è ammissibile all’interno del perimetro del licenziamento economico, a maggior ragione la nullità del divieto non può estendersi all’ipotesi di recesso per superamento del periodo di comporto che è soggetto alle regole dettate dall’art. 2110 c.c., prevalenti, per la loro specialità, sia sulla disciplina generale della risoluzione del contratto per impossibilità parziale della prestazione lavorativa, sia sulla disciplina limitativa dei licenziamenti individuali.
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