Notification of dismissal: ordinary e-mail is sufficient if the employee has knowledge of it

With the recent order no. 13731 of May 11, 2026, the Court of Cassation ruled on the validity and effectiveness of a dismissal notification sent via e-mail. The Court held that a clause in a national collective labor agreement (CCNL) that prescribes specific methods for communicating disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal (such as registered letter with return receipt, hand-delivered registered letter, or certified electronic mail), does not constitute a “conventional form” under Article 1352 of the Civil Code, the violation of which would affect the validity of the act of dismissal. This clause, in fact, does not pertain to the phase of formation and drafting of the legal act, but governs the subsequent phase of its communication to the recipient. Consequently, a different communication (from that contractually provided for), such as an ordinary email, does not lead to the invalidity or ineffectiveness of the dismissal, provided that the act, drawn up in written form as required by Article 2 of Law no. 604/1966, has nevertheless reached the employee’s sphere of knowledge and that the CCNL does not expressly sanction the violation of this communication method with ineffectiveness.

The merits proceedings

The dispute originated from the challenge of a disciplinary dismissal communicated by a company to its employee via ordinary e-mail. Following a series of claims relating to his remuneration during an assignment abroad and upon his return to Italy, the employee was dismissed for alleged disciplinary breaches.

The employee brought proceedings before the Court of Forlì, claiming, among other things, the nullity and/or unlawfulness of the dismissal due to the breach of the agreed form provided under Article 79 of the relevant CCNL (wood and furniture sector). Said provision established that disciplinary sanctions had to be communicated by registered mail with return receipt, hand-delivered registered mail, or certified electronic mail (PEC). Both in the summary phase and in the subsequent opposition proceedings, the Court rejected the employee’s claims.

Subsequently, the Bologna Court of Appeal dismissed the employee’s appeal, confirming the first-instance decision. The appellate court held that, pursuant to Article 2 of Law No. 604/1966, the ineffectiveness of a dismissal is linked exclusively to the lack of written form of the notice itself, a requirement that had been complied with in the case at hand. According to the lower courts, the CCNL provision did not concern the validity of the dismissal as such, but rather the distinct issue of its communication. Therefore, absent any express sanction in the CCNL for failure to comply with the prescribed communication methods, and given that the means actually used (ordinary e-mail) had nonetheless achieved its purpose by bringing the notice to the employee’s knowledge, no invalidity of the dismissal could arise. The Court of Appeal also found the disciplinary allegations proven and rejected the claim that the dismissal was retaliatory in nature.

The ruling of the Supreme Court

Following the employee’s appeal, the Supreme Court, with the order under review, dismissed the appeal, confirming the Court of Appeal’s decision and providing important clarification on the distinction between the form of a legal act and the means of its communication.

The appellant mainly alleged a breach of Articles 79 of the CCNL and 1352 of the Civil Code, arguing that the collective bargaining provision established an “agreed form” for dismissal, the violation of which should have entailed the nullity of the notice.

The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, drawing a clear conceptual distinction.

The Court held that the CCNL provision does not concern the “phase of formation, drafting and manifestation of the legal act,” but merely regulates “the subsequent phase of communication.” The literal wording of the contractual provision, which uses the verb “to communicate,” unequivocally clarifies that the provision governs the process aimed at bringing an already written notice to the recipient’s knowledge.

Consequently, the clause does not establish a form requirement ad substantiam for the validity of the termination notice. Its function is merely organizational, intended to ensure certainty as to receipt of the notice. The Court further clarified that, absent an express provision in the CCNL sanctioning the breach of the prescribed communication methods with ineffectiveness, the use of a different communication method cannot undermine the validity of the dismissal, provided that the notice was made in writing and its receipt by the employee is proven.

This principle is consistent with settled case law distinguishing between the form of the dismissal notice, which must be in writing under penalty of ineffectiveness, and the actual means of transmission, which the legislature does not specifically regulate, thereby leaving room for collective bargaining autonomy to introduce, where appropriate, stricter requirements aimed at protecting employees.

However, as clarified by the Supreme Court, in order for the breach of such additional communication requirements to result in the ineffectiveness of the dismissal, the collective agreement must expressly provide for such consequence, elevating compliance with the prescribed communication method to a constitutive requirement for the effectiveness of the dismissal itself. In the absence of such provision, the clause remains merely organizational in nature, and its breach does not invalidate the notice where the purpose of the communication has nonetheless been achieved.