Multiple dismissals and standing to sue: the Court of Appeal of Bologna clarifies the distinction between “simultaneous” and “subsequent” dismissals

In its judgment no. 500/2025, the Court of Appeal of Bologna, on 13 October 2025, provides an important analysis of the principles governing challenges to multiple dismissals served on the same employee, with a specific focus on the distinction between “subsequent” and “simultaneous” dismissals and the resulting procedural implications. The Court, upholding the first-instance decision, rejected the employee’s appeal and reiterated that the failure to challenge one of the two dismissals in court makes that dismissal final, thereby eliminating any standing to sue (i.e. “interesse ad agire”) in relation to the other.

The facts and the first-instance decision

The case originated from two dismissals for just cause served on a branch manager. The employer had contested two separate disciplinary charges: the first concerning unauthorised absences, and the second concerning irregular use of the company fuel card. At the end of the two disciplinary proceedings, the employer issued two separate dismissal letters, one for each charge. Both letters were received by the employee at the same time.

The employee challenged both dismissals out of court with a single notice, but subsequently brought judicial proceedings only against the first dismissal, and not against the second.

The first-instance court dismissed the claim for “lack of concrete standing to sue”. The Tribunal reasoned that even if the challenged dismissal were found unlawful, the employment relationship would still be deemed terminated due to the second dismissal, which – having not been challenged in court – had become valid, effective, and capable of producing its effects.

The decision of the Court of Appeal

The employee appealed the first-instance judgment, raising three grounds of appeal. The core of his defence lay in the first ground, in which he challenged the finding of lack of standing. The appellant argued that the two dismissals, although sent on the same day, had been issued at different times (3:15 p.m. and 3:17 p.m.), thus constituting so-called “successive dismissals”.

Relying on Italian Supreme Court case law (judgments no. 106/2013, no. 1244/2011, and no. 2274/2024), he argued that the second dismissal should be considered tamquam non esset, as it was based on facts already known to the employer at the time of the first dismissal. Therefore, the second dismissal was non-existent, and his interest in obtaining a ruling on the unlawfulness of the first dismissal should be recognised. In the remaining grounds of appeal, he reiterated his arguments on the merits, contesting the factual basis of the alleged unauthorised absences and seeking reinstatement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, holding the first ground unfounded and the others absorbed. The decision rests on a careful analysis of the legal nature of dismissals and the moment at which they take effect.

The central issue in the judgment is the classification of the two dismissals as simultaneous, rather than subsequent.

The Court clarified that the case law on “successive dismissals”, invoked by the appellant, does not apply, as it concerns dismissals served at different and subsequent points in time. To establish simultaneity, the panel identified the legally relevant moment not in the date or time of dispatch of the letters, but in the moment of their receipt by the employee. As dismissals are unilateral receptive acts, their effectiveness depends on when they enter the employee’s sphere of knowledge.

The Court emphasised that: “…this conclusion follows from the fact that the two dismissals affecting the present appellant – although distinct – must be considered simultaneous, and the principles set out in the Supreme Court case law relied upon by the appellant […] cannot apply, as they concern cases of dismissals that are subsequent to one another (so-called ‘successive dismissals’).”

The Court also highlighted that the employee’s own out-of-court challenge, which referred to both dismissals with a single date (28 June 2023) and without distinguishing the time of receipt, further confirmed their simultaneous nature.

On this basis, the Court upheld the correctness of the first-instance judgment. Since the second dismissal (concerning the fuel card) was not challenged in court within the 180-day statutory limitation period, it became final and fully effective in terminating the employment relationship.

This rendered any ruling on the lawfulness of the first dismissal irrelevant. Even if the first dismissal were declared null or unlawful, the employment relationship would in any event be considered terminated by the second dismissal, which had become definitive due to the lack of judicial challenge. Accordingly, the employee no longer had any concrete and current interest in obtaining a judgment on the first dismissal, thus justifying the procedural dismissal of the claim.